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ABSTRACT 
 
Despite the international recognition of religious freedom as a 
fundamental human right, recent developments in the United States and 
Europe reveal that the Islamic faith has been singled out qua Islam for 
special prohibitions.  The question is whether this sectarian approach is 
compatible with the normative liberal approach to religious freedom 
that emphasizes egalitarianism and neutrality.  The answer to this 
question is, no.  Although religion within the paradigm of liberal 
political philosophy does not warrant special legal protection qua 
religion, this article contends that it is equally troublesome to single out 
religion qua religion for special disfavored treatment, even if the 
justification is facially neutral.  This article uses facially neutral 
examples, such as: the French burqa-ban case, the Travel Ban project 
of President Trump, and the anti-Sharia debacle in the state of 
Oklahoma.  This article draws on the dichotomous approach of liberal 
political philosophy to religion and develops a non-sectarian framework 
of arguments to defend religious liberty. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In June 2018, the Austrian government decided in an 
unprecedented step to close seven mosques and expel dozens of 
imams.1  The closure was based on the 2015 “Islam-bill” that singles 
out Islamic organizations for a special ban: the prohibition on receiving 
foreign funding.2  The government reasoned the closure would protect 
                                                          
1.  Tom Barnes, Austria to close seven mosques and deport imams in crackdown 
on ‘political Islam’, INDEPENDENT (June 8, 2018), 
https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/austria-close-mosques-expel-
imams-crackdown-55742091. 
2.  Section 6. (2) of the Austrian Islam Bill prohibits Islamic Organizations from 
accepting foreign funding: “The procurement of funds for the usual activity to satisfy 
religious needs of [the] members [of the Islamic Religious Society] has to be 
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diversity by standing against the spread of political Islam and thus 
prevent radicalization and the creation of parallel societies in Austria.3  
At the same time, regarding the same issue, and by reference to the same 
concerns, an overwhelming majority of the Dutch Tweede Kamer 
(House of Representatives) has urged the government to intensely 
monitor the sources of funding for Dutch mosques.4  The majoritarian 
concern is that foreign money has been used as a tool to create support 
for a message opposing the dominant standards of the Dutch society.  
Under the guise of combatting the “undesirable influence” from “unfree 
states,” the Tweede Kamer adopted eight resolutions.5  These 
resolutions varied from the call for a new study about the financial 
sources of Dutch mosques to the ban on government subsidies for 
Islamic organizations that disturb the integration process of 
immigrants.6  The European concern about the unwanted influences 
from the “unfree states,” referring to states in the Gulf region, has also 
manifested itself in another way.  In the aftermath of the theoterrorist 
attacks, meaning terrorism justified on religious grounds,7 and in 
                                                          
undertaken inland by the Religious Society, the local communities respectively their 
members.”  Islamgesetz 2015, StF: BGBl. I Nr. 39/2015 (Austria), translated in: 
Federal Law on the External Legal Relationships of Islamic Societies – Islam Law 
2015 https://www.bmeia.gv.at/fileadmin/user_upload/Zentrale/Integration/ 
Islamgesetz/Islam_Law.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2019). 
3.  Nadine Schmidt & Judith Vonberg, Austria to close seven mosques, expel 
imams, CNN (June 8, 2018), https://edition.cnn.com/2018/06/08/europe/austria-
mosques-imams-intl/index.html. 
4.  See Agenda Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal, vergaderjaar 2017–2018, 
ag-tk-2018-06-01, nr. 11, at 3 (Neth.) (discussing the amount of resolutions submitted 
during the parliamentary debate about the funding of mosques in the Netherlands). 
5.  Kamerstukken II 2017/18, 29 614, nr. 82 (resolution Sjoerdsma/Segers); 
Kamerstukken II 2017/18, 29 614, nr. 82 (resolution Becker/Segers) (Neth.) (on file 
with author); see generally Tamar de Waal, “Make Sure You Belong!” A Critical 
Assessment of Integration Requirements for Residential and Citizenship Rights in 
Europe, 25 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (on file with author) 
(discussing the “integration debate” in Europe). 
6.  Id 
7.  See Paul B. Cliteur, Tolerantie en Theoterrorisme [Tolerance and 
Theoterrorism], in FRANS KRAP & WILLEM SINNINGHE DAMSTE (EDS.), OVER 
TOLERANTIE GESPROKEN [SPEAKING OF TOLERANCE] 167-69 (2016); see also Paul 
Cliteur, BARDOT, FALLACI, HOUELLEBECQ EN WILDERS [BARDOT, FALLACI, 
HOUELLEBECQ EN WILDERS] 2016 (on file with author); Donna E. Arzi, The Role of 
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reaction to the political developments in the Middle-East,8 some 
European authorities decided to critically scrutinize the work of Islamic 
preachers.9  A minimally noticed and criticized instrument that is 
widely used in this context concerns the policy of targeting a particular 
category of Islamic preachers for special restrictions.10  This category 
of religious leaders is usually accused of spreading messages of hatred 
and violence.11  This approach of targeting Islamic extremism manifests 
itself in multiple ways and on different levels.  As such, on the level of 
public and political debate, the language used to address Muslim 
radicalization is quite aggressive in tone.12  The concepts of “hate 
                                                          
Compulsion in Islamic Conversion: Jihad, Dhimma and Ridda, 8 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. 
REV. 15 (2002) (exploring the content of Islamic dogmas, such as Jihad and apostasy).  
8.  See KARIN VEEGENS, A DISRUPTED BALANCE? (2011) (discussing the 
criminal law developments in reaction to terrorist attacks under the flag of religion); 
see also Mark D. Kielsgard, A Human Rights Approach to Counter-Terrorism, 36 
CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 249 (2006). 
9.  Alexander Tsesis, Terrorist Speech on Social Media, 70 VAND. L. REV. 651 
(2017) (discussing the debate in the U.S.); Michiel Bot, The Right to Offend: 
Contested Speech Acts and Critical Democratic Practice, 24 LAW & LITERATURE 232, 
238 (2012) (paying attention to the Dutch debate on reducing the influence of radical 
Imams).  
10.  See generally Khaled A. Beydoun, Muslim Bans and the (Re)Making of 
Political Islamophobia, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 1733 (2017) (providing some insights in 
the background of targeting Muslims in the U.S.); Jeroen Temperman, Freedom of 
Expression and Religious Sensitivities in Pluralist Societies: Facing the Challenge of 
Extreme Speech, 2011 BYU L. REV. 729 (2011) (discussing the challenges of religious 
sensitivity to free speech and how this right to free expression has been affected by 
those sensitives); see also Robin Edger, Are Hate Speech Provisions Anti-
Democratic: An International Perspective, 26 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 119 (2010) 
(assessing the Canadian attempts to deal with “hate speeches” from an international 
law perspective); Helen Ginger Berrigan, “Speaking Out” about Hate Speech, 48 
LOY. L. REV. 1 (2002) (defining hate speech). 
11.  This article does not aim to challenge the positive obligation states have 
under international law to protect minorities from hate speech.  However, it aims to 
create awareness about framing the followers of one particular religious faith as 
potential terrorists and thus singling out that religion for special bans.  See Nazila 
Ghanea, Minorities and Hatred: Protections and Implications, 17 INT’L J. ON 
MINORITY & GROUP RTS. 423, 425 (2010); Robert A. Kahn, Flemming Rose, the 
Danish Cartoon Controversy, and the New European Freedom of Speech, 40 CAL. W. 
INT’L L.J. 253 (2010) (discussing the clash between free speech and religious 
freedom). 
12.  The anti-radicalization policies developed in this regard fit the propagated 
idea of tolerating only those versions of the Islam that fit European values.  See 
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Imams” and “hate preachers” seem to be completely integrated in this 
debate.13  On the level of anti-radicalization policies, the instruments 
addressing Muslim-extremism appear to be as severe as the tone of the 
anti-radicalization debate.  These policies include the following: (1) 
indefinitely and “without delay” shutting down mosques and Islamic 
institutes;14 (2) frustrating the broadcast of TV channels;15 (3) explicit 
refusal of permissions to build mosques;16 (4) withdrawal of residence 
permits;17 (5) imposition of area bans;18 (6) invalidating issued travel 
                                                          
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, DRAFT REPORT ON FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF 
THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON TERRORISM recommendation 15 (2018). 
13.  See Beydoun, supra note 10 (critiquing this development in the U.S. 
context).  
14.  Cf. EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, supra note 12 (explicitly calling upon its 
member-states to close “without delay” mosques and other Islamic institutes that 
violate EU values); Susanne Schröter, Debating Salafism, Traditionalism and 
Liberalism: Muslims and the State in Germany, in MOHA ENNAJI (ED.) NEW 
HORIZONS OF MUSLIM DIASPORA IN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA 215 (2016) (on 
file with author); see also Harriet Agerholm, Muslims stage mass prayer in protest 
over closure of mosques in Italy, INDEPENDENT (Oct. 23, 2016), 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/muslims-stage-mass-prayer-
protest-over-closure-mosques-italy-rome-demonstration-islamophobia-
a7376286.html (reporting that Italian authorities have closed mosques on remarkable 
“administrative grounds” and highlighting that politicians have expressed their 
concerns about the existence of unofficial “garage mosques”).  
15.  EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, supra note 12 (without providing a clear 
definition of “hate preacher,” the European Parliament urges the committee in its draft 
report to take legislative steps meant to measure the effectiveness of knocking down 
foreign TV channels spreading messages contrary to EU values). 
16.  Cf. Giorgio Ghiglione in Sesto San Giovann, The fall of ‘Italy’s Stalingrad’: 
symbol of left wages war on migrants and poor, GUARDIAN (May 22, 2018), 
https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2018/may/22/fall-italy-stalingrad-sesto-san-
giovanni-milan-symbol-of-the-left-wages-war-on-migrants-and-the-poor (reporting 
on how the presence of a terrorist in a small Italian town unfairly played a role in not 
granting construction permission for the building of a mosque). 
17.  Cf. Human Rights Without Frontiers, Belgian court decision blocking 
deportation of Brussels grand mosque imam appealed to the council of state, (Nov. 
30, 2017), http://hrwf.eu/belgian-court-decision-blocking-deportation-of-brussels-
grand-mosque-imam-appealed-to-the-council-of-state/ (paying attention to the highly 
controversial deportation case of the Egyptian imam Abdelhadi Sewif who lived for 
13 years in Belgium and was accused of spreading radicalism.  Eventually, a Belgium 
court stopped the deportation process). 
18.  The Dutch Raad van State, Council of State May 30, 2018, no. 
201709324/1/A3, ECLI:NL:RVS:2018:1763 (Neth.) (ruling that the imposed area ban 
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visas to attend conferences and symposia;19 and (7) proposals aimed at 
amending criminal law enforcing the law against the “hate Imams” and 
takfiri Islamists,20 who label other Muslims as apostates.21 
                                                          
on a Muslim preacher was justified in light of the risk of radicalizing believers in those 
particular neighborhoods of The Hague, leaving aside the argument of the preacher 
that he is manifesting his religion). 
19.  See Teis Jensen, Denmark bans six ‘hate preachers’ from entering the 
country, REUTERS (May 2, 2017), https://ca.reuters.com/article/topNews/ 
idCAKBN17Y1MV-OCATP (last visited Feb. 27, 2019); see also 
https://www.rtlnieuws.nl/nieuws/binnenland/stichting-verbijsterd-over-intrekking-
visa-imams (in 2015 the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs invalidated the issued 
travel visas of three controversial Islamic preachers that aimed to attend a money 
raising “gala” in the Dutch city of Rijswijk); cf. Regional Court of Oost-Brabant 
December 23, 2015, no. SHE 15/6861, ECLI:NL:RBOBR:2015:7607 (Neth.) (the 
mayor of Eindhoven banned the organizers of an Islamic conference); see also 
Regional Court of Oost-Brabant January 30, 2017, no. SHE 16/2650, 
ECLI:NL:RBOBR:2017:415 (Neth.) (the court overturned the 2015 interim judgment 
and ruled that the ban was an inadmissible violation of the right to religious freedom 
and the freedom of association).  
20.  See Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal [The House of Representatives], 
Aanhangsel Handelingen II [Parliamentary Proceedings II] 2017/2018, at 68-35-12 
(Neth.) (showcasing a recent debate in the Netherlands).  Amending criminal law for 
this purpose is highly controversial. The liberal criticism is of Ayaan Hirsi Ali, a 
former member of the Dutch House of Representatives, saying that according to our 
modern standards, the Islamic Prophet is a warlord.  If he is allowed to say this then 
why should a local conservative imam not be left room for saying that the mayor of 
Rotterdam is an apostate, however shocking and objectionable the content of both 
statements may be. Cf. Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The 
Vulnerability of Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious 
Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1245, 1292 (1994) (arguing that it would be 
“unacceptable” from a normative point of view to give a different treatment to very 
similar cases).  
21.  Eli Alshech, The Doctrinal Crisis within the Salafi-Jihado Ranks and the 
Emergence of Neo-Takfirism, 21 ISLAMIC L. & SOC’Y 419, 437 (2014) (explaining 
what the takfiri ideology entails and providing an overview of the recent 
developments regarding the thinking of this sect).  
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These recent developments have two key commonalities.  First, a 
latent presence of Islamophobia,22 a kind of Islam and Muslim fear.23  
As highlighted by Justice Sotomayor in her dissenting opinion in Trump 
v. Hawaii,24 this fear is gradually growing and institutionalizing.  
Second, the deep commitment to undo beliefs, expressions, and 
manifestations that deviate from the required and dominant standards 
to save mainstream culture fuels the façade of the anti-terrorism and 
anti-radicalization agenda.  One example of attempting to preserve 
mainstream culture is highlighted in the case of Awad v. Ziriax, which 
was brought before the Court in the aftermath of the so-called “Save 
Our State” Amendment.25 
                                                          
22.  Sohail Wahedi, EU wil islam anders behandelen [EU wants to treat Islam 
differently], ND (July 31, 2018), https://www.nd.nl/nieuws/opinie/eu-wil-islam-
anders-behandelen.3082450.lynkx (last visited Feb. 27, 2019) (defining Islamophobia 
as fear for the Islam and Muslims and warning for the institutionalization of 
Islamophobia); see also ENES BAYRAKLI & FARID HAFEZ, EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA 
REPORT 2017 (2018); cf. Yaseen Eldik & Monica C. Bell, The Establishment Clause 
and Public Education in an Islamophobic Era, 8 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 245 (2012). 
23.  Christian Joppke, Pluralism vs. Pluralism: Islam and Christianity in the 
European Court of Human Rights, in RELIGION, SECULARISM, AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEMOCRACY 88 (Jean Louise Cohen & Cécile Laborde eds., 2016) (analyzing the case 
law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in religious freedom cases and 
claiming that the Court interprets pluralism as a value that is threatened by the Islamic 
faith and needs therefore be protected).  
24.  Cf. Trump v. Hawaii 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2433 (2018) (Sotomayor, S., 
dissenting) (Justice Sotomayor criticizes the contentious “Travel Ban” that was 
designed and enforced just shortly after President Donald J. Trump came to power.  
She notes the Supreme Court’s majority fails to see that the travel ban is a violation 
of religious neutrality and a clear sign of Muslim fear.  Sotomayor says that 
“repackaging” the ban as a security need, knowing that its background is laid down in 
the electoral promise of shutting down the U.S. borders for Muslims, “does little to 
cleanse [the Travel Ban] of the appearance of discrimination that the President’s 
words have created.  Based on the evidence in the record, a reasonable observer would 
conclude that the Proclamation was motivated by anti-Muslim animus . . . The 
majority holds otherwise by ignoring the facts, misconstruing our legal precedent, and 
turning a blind eye to the pain and suffering the [Travel Ban] inflicts upon countless 
families and individuals, many of whom are United States citizens.”). 
25.  See Brenna Bhandar, The Ties that Bind Multiculturalism and Secularism 
Reconsidered, 36 J.L. & SOC’Y 301, 304, 326 (2009) (discussing multiculturalism and 
secularism as established dominant political doctrines dealing with diversity.  
Bhandar claims that these political theories “reproduce and hold in place a unitary, 
sovereign political subjectivity.  Despite their ostensible differences as political 
ideologies, both multiculturalism and secularism are deployed as techniques to govern 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3385444 
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This strategy of reconciliation26 touches on diversity and issues 
related to diversity, from a biased and dominant majoritarian 
perspective.27  The main aim of this reconciliation strategy is to make 
diversity as a concept, “majoritarian-proof.”28  That is to say, what is 
considered to fit the diversity concept passes through the majoritarian 
                                                          
difference.”  She concludes by saying that both political theories have in common the 
objective “to govern and manage difference that is perceived to violate dominant 
norms and values, defined in reference to the Christian cultural heritage of the nation 
state.”); see also Steven M. Rosato, Saving Oklahoma’s Save Our State Amendment: 
Sharia Law in the West and Suggestions to Protect Similar State Legislation from 
Constitutional Attack, 44 SETON HALL L. REV. 659 (2014); Michael A. Helfand, 
Religious Arbitration and the New Multiculturalism: Negotiating Conflicting Legal 
Orders, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1231 (2011). 
26.  S.A.S. v. France, App. No. 43835/11, Eur. Ct. H. R. ¶ 126 (2014) (Fr.) (the 
Court rules that for “democratic societies, in which several religions coexist within 
one and the same population, it may be necessary to place limitations on freedom to 
manifest one’s religion or beliefs in order to reconcile the interests of the various 
groups and ensure that everyone’s beliefs are respected.”); see also Kokkinakis v. 
Greece, App. No. 14307/88, Eur. Ct. H. R. ¶ 33 (1993) (Greece) (the ECtHR 
formulated in this first religious freedom judgment the “reconciliation formula,” using 
the same language as in S.A.S. v. France); see also Mark Hill, Tensions and Synergies 
in Religious Liberty: An Evaluation of the Interrelation of Freedom of Belief with 
Other Human Rights; Parallel Equality and Anti-discrimination Provisions; 
Enforcement in Competing European Courts; and Mediated Dispute Resolution, 2014 
BYU L. REV. 547 (2014) (providing some insights and background in the case law of 
the ECtHR on religious freedom).  
27.  Eoin Daly, Fraternalism as a Limitation on Religious Freedom: The Case 
of S.A.S. v. France, 11 RELIGION & HUM. RTS. 140, 165 (2016) (criticizing the way 
contentious practices of religious minorities have often been approached from an 
ethnocentric perspective that has been grounded on majoritarian cultural norms that 
provide little room for the habits of cultural and religious minorities); see also Anna 
Triandafyllidou, Tariq Modood & Ricard Zapata-Barrero, European challenges to 
multicultural citizenship. Muslims, secularism and beyond, in ANNA 
TRIANDAFYLLIDOU, TARIQ MODOOD & RICARD ZAPATA-BARRERO (EDS.), 
MULTICULTURALISM, MUSLIMS AND CITIZENSHIP. A EUROPEAN APPROACH 1, 3 
(2006) (saying that “there is a widespread perception that Muslims are making 
politically exceptional, culturally unreasonable or theologically alien demands upon 
European states.”).  
28.  Cf. Irene Zubaida Khan, The Rule of Law and the Politics of Fear: Human 
Rights in the Twenty-First Century, 14 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 2 (2008) (outlining 
her “Afghanistan experience” and claiming: “What I saw in Kabul in 2003 is a 
microcosm of what I see is happening across our world today; a world where the 
interests of the powerful and the privileged prevail over those of the poor and the 
marginalised, and security trumps human rights.”). 
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lens of skepticism and beats the criticism of favoritisms toward 
religious believers or immigrants.  Thus, what diversity should entail is 
made dependent upon the desires and wishes of a dominant majority.29  
This idea of making diversity majoritarian-proof has serious 
consequences for the true free exercise of fundamental rights (i.e., 
freedom of religion, freedom of expression, and freedom of 
association).  The non-sectarian and thus the egalitarian approach to 
fundamental rights is threatened.30  In addition, the reconciliation 
strategy involves another highly unpleasant risk. 
Specifically, the reconciliation strategy concerns the emergence of 
a “Chrisotcracy” and the shifting away from the religion-neutral liberal 
democracy.31  Here, Christocracy does not refer to a theocracy that is 
governed by Jesus’ words or following God’s divine revelations in the 
Holy Bible.32  The type of Christocracy emerging here takes the form 
                                                          
29.  Cf. Bhandar, supra note 25, at 315 (discussing the British dilemma of how 
to deal with religious manifestations of Muslims in the aftermath of theoterrorism and 
the rise of radicalism and extremism).  
30.  The egalitarian interpretation of religion and religious freedom is not 
affected by the specific beliefs that form the basis of certain claims for exceptions.  
See RONALD DWORKIN, RELIGION WITHOUT GOD, 146 (2013).  Another appropriate 
example in this context is the local French ban on wearing the so-called Burkini that 
covers the whole body except the face, arguing that this piece of clothing is not 
“respectful of good morals and of secularism,” completely ignoring similar clothing 
worn by non-Muslim women.  See Alissa J. Rubin, French ‘Burkini’ Bans Provoke 
Backlash as Armed Police Confront Beachgoers, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/25/world/europe/france-burkini.html; see also 
Mohamed Abdelaal, Extreme Secularism vs. Religious Radicalism: The Case of the 
French Burkini, 23 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 443, 454 (2017) (discussing the way 
French courts have dealt with the legality of the ban on wearing burkini).  One of the 
sectarian arguments that is used to justify a non-egalitarian application of religious 
freedom is laid down in the idea that Christianity stands for peace while Islam is 
inherently violent: STAATKUNDIG GEREFORMEERDE PARTIJ (“SGP”) [THE DUTCH 
REFORMED POLITICAL PARTY], ISLAM IN NEDERLAND [ISLAM IN THE NETHERLANDS] 
3, 4 (2017), https://www.sgp.nl/actueel/manifest—islam-in nederland/6125 (last 
visited Feb. 27, 2019). 
31.  Wahedi, supra note 22 (raising up the question as to whether liberal 
democracies are moving toward a regime that is democratic for the “native” majority 
and “reactionary” in its approach toward the minorities’ claims for exemptions from 
general laws).  
32.  Cf. Erik J. Krueger, God versus Government: Understanding State 
Authority in the Context of the Same-Sex Marriage Movement, 7 LIBERTY U. L. REV. 
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of a democracy for the “natives,” which consists of a Christian majority 
who have full access to the basic liberties.33  However, this privilege is 
not reserved for religious minorities.34  The concept of Christocracy is 
quite ethnocentric in its response to the claims, manifestations, and 
beliefs of other religious minorities.35  This response is meant to 
promote the Christian, and as claimed by some, the Judeo-Christian 
heritage of Westerns societies.  The proponents of this line consider this 
historic heritage the cradle of European civilization that has brought 
liberties and prosperity to Western nations.36 
The emergence of the reconciliation strategy, and the rise of 
ethnocentrism across Western democracies such as the United States 
and Europe, might affect the propagated egalitarian understanding of 
religious freedom and the idea of “living together in diversity.”37  Thus, 
                                                          
235, 237 (2013) (Krueger describes Christocracy as “a community of Christians 
governed by Christ through the Church according to the immutable divine law.”). 
33.  See SGP, supra note 30, at 3-4. 
34.  See generally Najmeh Mahmoudjafari, Religion and Family Law: The 
Possibility of Pluralistic Cooperation, 82 UMKC L. REV. 1077, 1085 (2014) (on file 
with author) (wondering whether the Muslim community could benefit from the same 
privileges of religious arbitration, as this option is for example available for the Jewish 
community). 
35.  Joppke, supra note 23, at 96 (in the religious freedom case law of the 
ECtHR, Joppke has discovered “a laxness for Christianity and an unforgiving stance 
toward Islam,” which he qualifies as “a double standard at work”); see also Sohail 
Wahedi & Renée Kool, De Strafrechtelijke aanpak van meisjesbesnijdenis in een 
rechtsvergelijkende context [The criminal law approach toward female circumcision: 
a comparative law perspective], 7 TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR RELIGIE, RECHT EN BELEID [J. 
FOR RELIGION, L. AND POL’Y], 51 (2016) (on file with author) (highlighting the 
emergence of ethnocentrism in the enforcement of laws against the practice of female 
genital mutilation).  
36.  Yasser Louati, Islamophobia in France. National Report 2017, in ENES 
BAYRAKLI & FARID HAFEZ (EDS.), EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2017 225 
(2018) (commenting on how French politicians have referred to the Judeo-Christian 
background of France to promote their political opinions. Louati says, “[w]hile [some 
French politicians] constantly pose as staunch advocates of a repressive laïcité when 
speaking of the religious rights of Muslims, they nevertheless invoke religious 
freedoms or the “Judeo-Christian roots” of France to justify special arrangements for 
their political base.”); see also Leyla Yildirim, Islamophobia in Netherlands. National 
Report 2017, in ENES BAYRAKLI & FARID HAFEZ (EDS.), EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA 
REPORT 2017 431 (2018) (for similar rhetoric used in the Netherlands). 
37.  Ilias Trispiotis, Two Interpretations of Living Together in European Human 
Rights Law, 75 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 580, 582 (2016) (arguing that “the historical 
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where does our analysis bring us in terms of the widely advocated 
egalitarian understanding of religious freedom in liberal political 
philosophy and the idea of “living together in diversity”?  To develop a 
robust theoretical framework that helps us reflect on this question, we 
should deal with two intertwined matters.  On the one hand, we have to 
deal with the question of religious freedom and its propagated non-
sectarian and egalitarian understanding.  On the other, we need to 
properly address the rise of ethnocentrism across Western democracies 
and the related concerns about the reconciliation strategy.38 
Our analysis begins with the question of whether the move toward 
ethnocentrism and the use of a reconciliation strategy reflect the 
propagated non-sectarian role religion should play for the purposes of 
religious accommodation and decisions taken in liberal democracies.39  
To explore more on this matter, we need to take two steps.  First, we 
need to conceptualize the reconciliation strategy.  Second, we need to 
provide a clear theoretical framework that helps us find out what role 
religion plays, for legal and political purposes, within the paradigm of 
liberal political philosophy.  A recent draft report of the special 
European Parliamentary committee on anti-terrorism provides a 
helping hand regarding this first step; the report urges member states to 
combat Islamic manifestations that violate European values.40  The 
same is true for the case law of the European Court of Human Rights 
(“ECtHR”).  The ECtHR has used the concept of “living together,” as 
used in S.A.S. v. France (S.A.S.), ruling that norms prohibiting or 
restricting “contentious religious manifestations” do not violate 
religious freedom.  The Court held that such prohibitions are meant to 
protect the rights and freedoms of others through ruling out religious 
practices that challenge the core values of a democratic society.41 
Part I of this article draws on relevant case law and the 
recommendations of the special committee to theorize the 
                                                          
emphasis on peaceful coexistence” reveals much of the way European authorities deal 
with religion). 
38.  Cf. Micah Schwartzman, Religion, Equality and Anarchy, in RELIGION IN 
LIBERAL POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 15 (Cécile Laborde & Aurélia Bardon eds., 2017) 
(explaining the relevant methodology). 
39.  Cf. CÉCILE LABORDE, LIBERALISM’S RELIGION (2017); CÉCILE LABORDE & 
AURÉLIA BARDON, RELIGION IN LIBERAL POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (2017). 
40.  EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, supra note 12.  
41.  S.A.S. v. France, ¶ 126 (2014). 
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reconciliation strategy.  Although this theorization rests heavily on 
European experiences, a similar development of reinforcing 
majoritarianism is happening in the United States.  The most recent case 
in the United States that illustrates reinforcing majoritarianism is Trump 
v. Hawaii.  However, the “Travel Ban” preceding this Supreme Court 
ruling is not unique in its effect of singling out one faith for a special 
ban.  The “Save Our State” Amendment in Oklahoma, resulting in 
Awad v. Ziriax,42 and the upcoming United States v. Nagarwala,43 
contain elements of what this article theorizes as the reinforcement of 
majoritarianism that causes feelings of anxiety toward the “stranger.”44 
Part II of this article focuses on whether the reconciliation strategy 
could be considered a paradigmatic expression of the most recent 
theoretical developments regarding the place of religion within liberal 
political philosophy.45  These developments involve a growing support 
                                                          
42.  This case concerned the lawfulness of State Question 755 that aimed to ban 
the use of Sharia Law in the courts of the state of Oklahoma.  Its author, Rex Duncan, 
presented his initiative as a necessary mean in the battle against an evil culture.  Both 
the District Court as well as the Court of Appeals decided that the ban—which was 
approved by more than 70% of the Oklahomans participating in the ballot—was 
clearly aimed at singling out the Islamic law for a disfavored treatment and for these 
reasons both legal instances held that challenger would likely be able to challenge this 
ban because it was unconditional and violated the Establishment Clause.  Awad v. 
Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (W.D. Okla. 2010); Awad v. Ziriax 670 F.3d 1111 (10th 
Cir. 2012); see Amara S. Chaudhry-Kravitz, The New Facially Neutral Anti-Shariah 
Bills: A Constitutional Analysis, 20 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 25, 31 
(2013); Lee Tankle, The Only Thing We Have to Fear Is Fear Itself: Islamophobia 
and the Recently Proposed Unconstitutional and Unnecessary Anti-Religion Laws, 21 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 273 (2012); Asma T. Uddin & Dave Pantzer, A First 
Amendment Analysis of Anti-Sharia Initiatives, 10 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 363 (2012).  
43.  United States v. Nagarwala, 350 F. Supp. 3d 613 (E.D. Mich. 2018) (the 
legality of female circumcision, which involves separating the mucous membrane 
from the genitalia, however the District Court held that the Federal law banning this 
practice is unconstitutional because “Congress had no authority to pass this statute 
under either the Necessary and Proper Clause or the Commerce Clause.”  The District 
Court referred in this respect to United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566, 115 S. Ct. 
1624 and Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. at 858, 134 S. Ct. 2077.  This case is pending 
appeal). 
44.  Trispiotis, supra note 37.  Here, “stranger,” means those who do not belong 
to an established majority, either because they adhere to another religion or because 
they have an immigrant background.  
45.  Part II includes and revises the analysis on the role of religion in liberal 
political philosophy that has been published previously.  See Sohail Wahedi, 
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for a “religion-empty” and a “God-empty” understanding of religion 
and religious freedom.46  Such understanding draws on non-
sectarianism, anti-favoritisms, and thus, an egalitarian approach to the 
beliefs, views, expressions, and manifestations of citizens.47  Part II 
helps us understand why religion qua religion does not require special 
protection.  Thus, each liberal protection provided for the exercise of 
religion takes place through finding suitable substitutes for the category 
of religion.  This means religion is only special because of abstraction.  
Allegedly, it is not possible to provide a liberal protection regime for 
religion qua religion.48  This theoretical framework helps us to answer 
the question of why majoritarian sensitivities seem to prevail in 
important free exercise cases. 
As we will see, in S.A.S. v. France, the ban on religious face-
covering veils has been justified as a matter of “living together.”49  The 
“Travel Ban” in Trump v. Hawaii was justified as a matter of security.50  
The “Save Our State” Amendment was a serious attempt to keep the 
“stranger”51 outside the territories of the state—a policy of fear that 
                                                          
Abstraction from the Religious Dimension, 24 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1 (2017-
2018).  
46.  See generally Wahedi, supra note 22.  
47.  Id. 
48.  STEVEN D. SMITH, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF AMERICAN RELIGIOUS 
FREEDOM 83 (2014). 
49.  The French ban on face-covering veils did not violate the right to Religious 
Freedom, as France had “a broad margin of appreciation” to make a choice regarding 
the lawfulness of face-covering veils.  
50.  For example, the first version of the travel ban, Executive Order 13769, 
Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States, explicitly 
said that  
Deteriorating conditions in certain countries due to war, strife, disaster, and 
civil unrest increase the likelihood that terrorists will use any means 
possible to enter the United States.  The United States must be vigilant 
during the visa-issuance process to ensure that those approved for admission 
do not intend to harm Americans and that they have no ties to terrorism. 
Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 FR 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017). 
51.  Sahar F. Aziz, A Muslim Registry: The Precursor to Internment, 2017 BYU 
L. REV. 779, 825 (2017); Eunice Lee, Non-Discrimination in Refugee and Asylum 
Law (Against Travel Ban 1.0 and 2.0), 31 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 459, 464 (2017) (both 
saying that the aim—as explicitly mentioned in the first version of the travel ban, 
Executive Order 13,769—to keep honor killers outside the United States is an obvious 
reference to Muslims). 
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advanced the political agenda of spreading anxiety toward the 
“stranger.”  Another example is United States v. Nagarwala, where the 
interventions were based on protecting girls, leaving zero room for 
analogies.52  Moreover, why do authorities allow religious male 
circumcision qua religious,53 while religious and ritual female 
circumcision has been outlawed in all its variants?  Part II also suggests 
that we can understand this way of “re-packaging” religious cases as 
“abstraction from the religious dimension,” which does not justify 
singling out one faith for special bans in liberal democracies. 
Part III draws on the liberal critique of singling out religion qua 
religion for special protection in law and the emergence of the 
reconciliation strategy.  Part III also addresses the shift toward 
ethnocentrism to provide a more “close-to-reality” conception of 
religious freedom that is “diversity-friendly,” “sectarian-proof,” and 
compatible with the egalitarian view of this right that rejects religious 
toleration qua religious.54 
This article concludes that although the presence of the 
reconciliation strategy and the shift toward ethnocentrism can be 
                                                          
52.  Cf. United States v. Nagarwala, 350 F. Supp. 3d 613 (E.D. Mich. 2018) 
(outlawing the Federal law on banning female circumcision and saying with reference 
to United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000) that “as the Supreme Court 
found in Morrison, rape and other forms of sexual assault against women are not 
economic or commercial activity, and therefore not part of an interstate market, no 
different conclusion can be reached concerning FGM, which is another form of 
gender-related violence.”). 
53.  Cf. Cent. Rabbinical Cong. of U.S. & Canada v. New York City Dep’t of 
Health & Mental Hygiene, 763 F.3d 183 (2d Cir. 2014) (on file with author) (holding 
that a local regulation banning the practice of immediate oral suction of the 
circumcision wound—also known as metzitzah b’peh and practiced by some 
Orthodox Jews—preventing the spread of (Herpes Simplex Virus) is not neutral nor 
generally applicable.  “The Regulation is not neutral because it purposefully and 
exclusively targets a religious practice for special burdens.  And . . . the Regulation is 
not generally applicable either, because it is underinclusive in relation to its asserted 
secular goals: the Regulation pertains to religious conduct associated with a small 
percentage of HSV infection cases among infants, while leaving secular conduct 
associated with a larger percentage of such infection unaddressed.”  In fact, the Court 
accepts at this point that ritual male circumcision is a permissible religious practice as 
it points out that the Regulation mainly “targets a religious practice for special 
burdens.”). 
54.  Part III includes and revises the analysis on the pragmatic defense of 
religious freedom that has been published previously.  See Sohail Wahedi, The Health 
Law Implications of Ritual Circumcisions, 22 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L. J 209 (2019). 
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theorized in light of the abstraction theory, as developed and defended 
in this article, we need to be very cautious about this justification.  After 
all, non-sectarianism and egalitarianism are two sides of the same coin.  
This means authorities need to be very careful about disfavoring 
harmless, though very different lifestyles that deviate from the desired 
standards.  This religion-empty understanding of religious freedom 
supports the proposition that people should be free to organize and live 
their lives as they choose.55  However, the reconciliation strategy and 
the emergence of strong ethnocentrism give cause to rethink religious 
freedom in a way that endorses diversity for pragmatic reasons, 
intending to avoid a Hobbesian “war of all against all.”56  Hence, this 
defense of religious freedom is rooted in grounds that are non-sectarian, 
non-majoritarian, and non-violent toward the advocated egalitarian 
conception of religious freedom.57 
I. THE RECONCILIATION STRATEGY 
Hidden behind the façade of “unity in diversity” that aims to 
combat “radical Islam” and support the moderate Muslim, a special 
anti-terrorism committee of the European Parliament has proposed in 
its recent report to only tolerate variants of Islam that are “in full 
accordance with EU values.”58  These values include respect for human 
rights, fundamental freedoms, human dignity, equality, and solidarity.59  
Mosques and other Islamic institutes that violate these values should be 
closed immediately.60  This radical proposal is the first serious and most 
comprehensive legislative attempt to create a legal basis for state 
interventions against norm deviant beliefs, expressions, and 
                                                          
55.  See generally DWORKIN, supra note 30 (this idea is grounded in the 
neutrality principle of liberal philosophy.  The State should act in a religion-blind way.  
This positions considers religion a non-sectarian concept that could help people to 
organize their lives independently, and thus without State interference, except for 
cases of harm or damages). 
56.  Cf. BRIAN LEITER, WHY TOLERATE RELIGION? 9 (2014). 
57.  Cf. Sohail Wahedi, Female circumcision as an African problem: double 
standards or harsh reality?, in CHRISTIAN GREEN, JEREMY GUNN & MARK HILL 
(EDS.), RELIGION, LAW AND SECURITY IN AFRICA 400 (2018).  
58.  EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, supra note 12, 17. 
59.  Id. at 14. 
60.  Id. at 17. 
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manifestations of a “contentious minority” in Europe.  However, it is 
not something completely unique.  On a different level and in a case by 
case assessment, judges across liberal democracies have ruled in a large 
number of cases on the legality of religious manifestations that are 
considered contrary to legal and social norms of society.61 
The legal outcomes of some of these cases are as controversial as 
the proposed plans of the special committee.  The controversy lies in 
two specific grounds that shape the contours of the reconciliation 
strategy.  First, some court judgments and the special committee report 
seek to adjust beliefs, expressions, and manifestations that violate 
general expectations about how one should live a life conforming to the 
dominant standards of the society.  Second, the court judgments and the 
recommendations of the European Parliament seem to single out one 
“contentious” minority for special bans and restrictions.  At this point, 
the majoritarian attitude is that some beliefs, expressions, and 
manifestations of this minority are unwelcome, anomalous, or simply 
problematic,62 as they do not show enough respect for the societal 
achievements of Western societies, such as the equality between men 
and women.63 
Taking both developments together unveils that very little of the 
propagated egalitarian and non-sectarian conception of religious 
                                                          
61.  Shelby L. Wade, Living Together or Living Apart from Religious 
Freedoms: The European Court of Human Right’s Concept of Living Together and 
Its Impact on Religious Freedom, 50 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 411 (2018); Sarah 
Trotter, Living Together, Learning Together, and Swimming Together: Osmanoglu 
and Kocabas v Switzerland (2017) and the Construction of Collective Life, 18 HUM. 
RTS. L. REV. 157, 169 (2018) (discussing the emergence of the “living together” 
doctrine in the case law of the ECtHR and how this shift move toward constructing a 
“common identity” has affected free exercise of religious freedom); Cf. Stephanie A. 
Ferraiolo, Justice for Injured Children: A Look into Possible Criminal Liability of 
Parents Whose Unvaccinated Children Infect Others, 19 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L. J. 29 
(2016); Geurt Henk Spruyt, Politicians and Epidemics in the Bible Belt, 12 UTRECHT 
L. REV. 114, 124 (2016) (refraining from child vaccination on religious grounds 
provides another appropriate example of a contentious religious manifestation).  Cf. 
John Alan Cohan, Honor Killings and the Cultural Defense, 40 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 
177 (2010). 
62.  Triandafyllidou, Modood & Zapata-Barrero, supra note 27, at 3. 
63.  Cf. Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij v. the Netherands (SGP), App. No. 
58369/10, Eur. Ct. H. R. (2012) (critically scrutinizing the practice of a “native” 
religious minority).  
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freedom has been adopted by decision makers in law and politics across 
liberal democracies.64 
Instead, the protection of the rights and freedoms of others has been 
prioritized to cut off non-mainstream ways of life.65  This approach is 
clearly present in the ECtHR’s case law concerning the legality of 
Islamic dress codes,66 such as headscarves and face-covering veils.67  
The European Parliament’s recent draft report highly relies on the same 
ECtHR formula.  The rule of thumb is that protecting the rights and 
freedoms of “others” justifies state practices that violate a minority’s 
rights.68  Hence, the special committee’s recommendations might sound 
radical or even contradictory to the concept of “living together” in peace 
and diversity, but it attempts to codify the line that was developed by 
the ECtHR.  In other words, the recommendations of the special 
committee and the ECtHR’s case law share exactly the same narrative 
                                                          
64.  Cf. Id.  The SGP case is controversial for several reasons.  Mainly, the idea 
that the State should not interfere in the way people want to give content to their lives, 
simply because the authorities do not appreciate that way of life, not because that way 
of life is causing harm or puts the safety of others under serious health risks.  See 
generally DWORKIN, supra note 30, and Michael J. Perry, From Religious Freedom 
to Moral Freedom, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 993 (2010) (arguing that the state should 
not prescribe how people should live their lives). 
65.  Cf. interview with the former acting mayor of Amsterdam Jozias van 
Aartsen: Niels Klaassen, ‘VVD moet moslims juist beschermen’ [‘VVD must protect 
Muslims’], AD (July 20, 2018) (on file with author) (Van Aartsen claims that much 
of the current policy is based on gut feelings and suspicion toward Muslims, while 
religious freedom is meant to stop the government from prescribing how one should 
exercise his religion).  
66.  The ECtHR judgment in the SGP case forms an exception to this view.  
Another exception to this rule is the court judgment in Refah Partisi and Others v. 
Turkey, App. Nos. 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98 and 41344/98, Eur. Ct. H. R. (2003) 
(in both judgments the major concern was the rights and freedoms of others).  
67.  Dahlab v. Switzerland, App. No. 42393/98, Eur. Ct. H. R. (2001) 
[hereinafter, Dahlab v. Switzerland]; Leyla Şahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98, Eur. 
Ct. H. R. (2005) [hereinafter Leyla Şahin v. Turkey].  See also Timothy J. Murphy, 
Comparative Secularism: Leaving Room for the Holy Spirit and Headscarves in 
Turkish and American Public Schools, 45 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 297 (2015) (providing a 
comparative critical analysis of the protection regime for religion in the United States 
and Turkey). 
68.  EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, supra note 12; see also Trotter supra note 61, at 
163 (analyzes and discusses the way the ECtHR has embraced through case law the 
doctrine of “living together” as part of the limitation ground “protecting the rights and 
freedoms of others” to justify restrictions upon religious freedom). 
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that, in turn, reconciles diversity with majoritarian sensitivities about 
the way people should live their lives.  What does this narrative exactly 
entail and how does it help us to theorize the reconciliation strategy?  
To answer this question, we can make use of the court’s ruling in S.A.S. 
and compare this decision to the special committee’s recommendations. 
A. S.A.S. v. France 
In S.A.S., the ECtHR used, for the first time, the predominantly 
French concept of “living together” to rule on the legality of the French 
ban on publicly wearing face-covering veils.69  The background of this 
judgment lies in the adoption of a highly controversial bill that aimed 
to ban face-covering dresses and veils, such as the burqa and niqab.70  
In July 2010, the French Assemblée Nationale passed the bill that was 
meant to prohibit concealing one’s face in the public space.  An absolute 
majority of the then present Assembly members voted in favor of this 
bill.  Only one member voted against it while three members 
abstained.71  In September 2010, the French Sénat adopted by an 
absolute majority the bill that criminalized wearing face-covering 
dresses in public (“prohibition law”).72 
                                                          
69.  Hakeem Yusuf, S.A.S. v. France: Supporting Living Together or Forced 
Assimilation, 3 INT’L HUM. RTS. L. REV. 277, 281 (2014) (criticizing the embracement 
of the French “living together” doctrine in S.A.S.). 
70.  LOI n° 2010-1192 du 11 octobre 2010 interdisant la dissimulation du 
visage dans l’espace public (LOI n° 2010-1192) [Law no. 2010-1192 of October 11, 
2010 prohibiting the concealment of the face in the public space] (Fran.).  
71.  See generally Assemblée nationale, Année 2010. – No 72 [2] A.N. (C.R.), – 
2e SÉANCE DU 13 JUILLET 2010, 5550 (Fran.) (on file with author) (335 out of 339 
present Assembly members voted in favor of the bill).  
72.  Sénat, Année 2010. – No 82 S. (C.R.), SÉANCE DU 14 SEPTEMBRE 2010, 
6763 (Fran.) (246 out of 247 present Senate members voted in favor of the bill. One 
member voted against). 
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1. The French Prohibition Law 
The French prohibition law, which has been active since April 
2011,73 prohibits anyone from covering his or her face in public,74 
unless this face concealment is required: (1) to fulfil a legal duty, (2) 
for a festivity, traditional, or artistic event, or (3) for the exercise of a 
particular sport.75  An individual who violates this prohibition is fined 
or obligated to take a course on citizenship, or a combination of both.76  
The parliamentary proceedings on this bill reveal that the main rationale 
behind this piece of legislation has been the complete withdrawal of the 
Islamic face-covering dresses, such as the burqa and niqab from the 
public space in France.77  The main justification for this intervention 
has been enshrined in the French idea of “living together” that has 
allegedly been threatened and frustrated by face-covering dresses.78  
                                                          
73.  See generally S.A.S. v. France, ¶¶ 14; 24-27 (providing a chronological 
overview of the legislative steps set to criminalize the concealment of the face in 
public).  
74.  LOI n° 2010-1192, (Article 1: No one may, within the public space, wear 
clothing that conceals the face.)  See also S.A.S. v. France, ¶ 28 (provides a translation 
of the French Law on face-covering veils). 
75.  LOI n° 2010-1192, Article 2, section II.  
76.  LOI n° 2010-1192, Article 3 (the amount of this fine is connected with the 
infringements of second class). 
77.  See Expose des Motifs, Explanatory Memorandum of LOI n° 2010-1192, 
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichLoiPubliee.do;jsessionid=A3D47BAB744505
C3074B405E1EA232DA.tplgfr25s_3?idDocument=JORFDOLE000022234691&ty
pe=expose&typeLoi=&legislature= (last visited Feb. 27, 2019) (according to this 
document that explains the rationale behind the bill, the French values of liberty, 
equality and fraternity, which “underpin the principle of respect for . . .  equality 
between men and women” are threatened “by the wearing of full veil”).  The 
quotations are based on the translation of the Expose des Motifs in S.A.S. v. France, 
¶ 25.  Also, the debates in the French Parliament reveals that the main aim of this 
prohibition has been the Islamic face-covering veils, like burqa and niqab.  As such, 
only during the three debate at the Assemblée nationale, these contentious pieces of 
clothes are mentioned 92 times. 
78.  Expose des Motifs, Explanatory Memorandum of LOI n° 2010-1192, supra 
note 77 (the main argument behind this bill has always been that face-covering dresses 
are incompatible with the idea of “living together.”  The Memorandum does not 
explicate what this concept entails.  However, it says that the French Republic is based 
on certain values, such as liberty, equality and fraternity and also some principles, like 
gender equality, which are threatened by a “sectarian manifestation” that rejects the 
values of the French Republic.  Hence, the Memorandum suggests that “the 
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The bill’s historical background is essential to better understand the 
rationale behind the bill.79  The bill’s historical background unveils that 
the concept of “living together” is basically defined by an exclusive 
French Republican ideal about how citizens should live and behave 
within the Republic,80 providing little room for groups or people who 
reject this view.81  Furthermore, this domestic background helps us 
evaluate the implications of adopting the ECtHR’s “living together” 
doctrine and its impact on the free exercise of religion and matters of 
diversity that are so closely related to this right.82 
2. The French Prohibition Law Before the European Court  
of Human Rights 
In S.A.S., a French citizen who was born in Pakistan but living in 
France, challenged the prohibition law.83  She described herself as a 
“devout Muslim.”84  In her public and private life, she occasionally 
                                                          
Republican social covenant” that forms the basis of the French society needs to be 
protected through outlawing practices that are contrary to this).  See also S.A.S. v. 
France, ¶¶ 25, 140-41.  This call can also be found back in the Parliamentary debate 
concerning the bill.  Cf. the position of André Gerin who has defended the prohibition, 
since “the burqa, is the refusal of the Republic”: Assemblée nationale, Année 2010. – 
No 70 [1] A.N. (C.R.), – 1re SÉANCE DU 7 JUILLET 2010, 5394 (Fran.) (on file with 
author). 
79.  Daly, supra note 27, at 141 (arguing that “living together,” which has 
played such an important role in the justification of the prohibition, is a French 
concept about the manners of behavior in public life, in other words, it concerns “the 
duty of fraternity”). 
80.  This line of reasoning is echoed very well by the contribution of Jean-
Claude Guibal, who was a member of the Union pour un mouvement populaire 
[Union for a Popular Movement] that was led by Nicolas Sarkozy.  During his address 
of the bill at the Assemblée nationale, Guibal defended the proposed prohibition and 
argued that although France is a tolerant society, it does not accept that some groups 
refuse to live in France as French people. Guibal said that such groups threatened 
“our” way of “living together” by their provocative behavior.  
81.  Daly, supra note 27, at 146-47 (criticizing the Court judgment in S.A.S.).  
This point of criticism was also mentioned by the applicant who challenged the French 
prohibition law before the ECtHR.  See S.A.S. v. France ¶ 77.  
82.  See Trotter, supra note 61.  
83.  S.A.S. v. France ¶ 76. 
84.  Id. ¶ 11. 
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covered her face for religious, cultural, and personal purposes.85  In 
doing so, she did not experience any forces or threats from her family 
or her husband to cover her face.86  If needed, she refrained from using 
her face-covering niqab or burqa.87  However, she insisted on having 
the option to cover her face when she was in a particular spiritual mood, 
such as during the Islamic fasting period.88 
Although she was not prosecuted for a breach of the new 
prohibition law nor did she experience any negative consequence 
immediately after the enactment of the prohibition law,89 she aimed to 
challenge the legality of this law for different reasons.90  However, for 
the purpose of theorizing the reconciliation strategy, we will only focus 
on the alleged violation of religious freedom and the way the ECtHR 
has dealt with this particular concern.91  The complaint about the 
violation of religious freedom rested strictly on two arguments.92  The 
first argument suggested that although the ban on wearing face-
covering dresses was prescribed by law,93 it generally lacked 
resemblance to any of the legitimate limitation grounds against the free 
exercise of religion.94  Moreover, the criticism put the defense of the 
French style of “living together” in the public area under critical 
                                                          
85.  Id. ¶ 12. 
86.  Id. ¶ 11. 
87.  Id. 
88.  Id. ¶ 12. 
89.  Id. ¶ 57. 
90.  Id. ¶¶ 69-73 (she argued before the Court that the French prohibition law 
put her at risk of harassment.  Furthermore, she claimed that the ban discriminated 
against her and violated her freedoms of expression, association, and respect for the 
private life). 
91.  See id. ¶¶ 76-80 (arguing why the ban violated her right to religious 
freedom and respect for the private life).  See id. ¶¶ 110-158 (the Court’s assessment 
of the complaint regarding the alleged violation of religious freedom and the right to 
respect the private life). 
92.  Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights [hereinafter, 
ECHR]. 
93.  S.A.S. v. France ¶ 76. 
94.  Id. ¶ 77 (the applicant argues why the prohibition law cannot pursue the 
legitimate limitation ground of “public safety,” since the ban was not designed for 
security reasons). 
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scrutiny.95  The argument was that this French justification for the 
prohibition law completely neglected the minority’s perspective.  This 
particular viewpoint rested on the idea that it is possible for minorities 
to peacefully live together with the majority, while keeping their own 
habits and traditions.96  In other words, living peacefully does not 
require the minority group to strictly follow the French style of “living 
together.”97  In the same way, presenting the law as a tool to pursue 
gender equality was considered a “simplistic” presentation of the reality 
in which there are groups of women who themselves choose to cover 
their faces.98 
The second argument that questioned the legality of the prohibition 
law challenged the “necessity” of this ban in light of the prohibition 
law’s justification.99  The criticism, at this point, contended that it is not 
                                                          
95.  See Assemblée nationale, supra note 71, at 5548 (on file with author).  The 
original text of this address reads as follows: 
“[L]e port du voile intégral constitue bien une pratique aux antipodes des 
valeurs qui fondent et structurent l’idée que tous ici nous nous faisons de la 
République.  C’est un déni de liberté lorsqu’il a lieu sous l’effet de la 
contrainte, que celle-ci soit patente ou diluée dans un environnement social 
; c’est une négation de l’égalité entre citoyens qui dépouille la femme de 
son identité, quand ce n’est pas de son humanité ; c’est un refus affiché de 
l’idéal de fraternité, une volonté de se soustraire au vivre ensemble 
républicain.”  
96.  See S.A.S. v. France ¶ 77. 
97.  Id. ¶ 77 in conjunction with ¶ 114.  
98.  Id. 
99.  Id. ¶ 111.  The ECtHR follows four specific steps to decide upon an alleged 
violation of the right to respect: private and family life; the freedom of thought, 
conscience, and religion; and freedom of expression, assembly, and association.  First, 
it decides upon the presence of an interference.  Second, it rules on the question as to 
whether this interference was prescribed by law.  Third, it answers the question 
whether this interference was meant to pursue one or more of legitimate limitation 
grounds upon fundamental freedoms.  Finally, it considers whether such a legitimate 
interference is necessary in a democratic society.  The necessity question is a 
proportionality test.  In fact, it helps judges determine whether a particular limitation 
upon a fundamental right “is necessary in a democratic society” to meet one or more 
of the legitimate limitation grounds, such as public safety, health, or morals, and the 
protection of public order as well as the rights and freedoms of others.  Although the 
Court does not want to frustrate the democratic decisions of national states that in 
some cases limit the exercise of fundamental freedoms, giving states a certain “margin 
of appreciation” to take decisions, it aims to consider whether there is a “pressing 
social need” for a specific limitation.  That pressing social need is meant to determine 
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to the authorities to favor or disfavor a particular lifestyle.  Thus, the 
critique was about state’s interferences in how people want to live their 
individual lives.100  More generally, the argument suggested that a free 
society should accommodate a wide range of people, both believers and 
non-believers.101  Hence, the authorities should not single out a 
particular lifestyle for disfavored treatment, even if there might be 
political support for that purpose.  In other words, political support for 
a limitation does not automatically say that the measure is “necessary 
in a democratic society.”102  The argument relied on the idea that French 
authorities have failed to study less restrictive measures that could have 
reached the same goals as the ones behind the prohibition law.103 
3. The Court’s Assessment of the Legality of the French  
Prohibition Law 
In the Court’s assessment of the alleged violation of the right to 
religious freedom, it first rules that the French prohibition law interferes 
with the right to free exercise of religion.104  Subsequently, the Court 
considers this “continuing interference” as sufficiently prescribed by 
                                                          
the limitation’s necessity.  See generally Steven Greer, The Interpretation of the 
European Convention on Human Rights: Universal Principle or Margin or 
Appreciation, 3 UCL HUM. RTS. REV. 1, 9 (2010); Gerorge Letsas, Two Concepts of 
the Margin of Appreciation, 26 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 705, 710-11 (2006) 
(analyzing how the ECtHR assesses complaints about alleged violation of 
fundamental rights).  See also Christopher Belelieu, The Headscarf as a Symbolic 
Enemy of the European Court of Human Rights’ Democratic Jurisprudence: Viewing 
Islam through a European Legal Prism in Light of the Sahin Judgment, 12 COLUM. J. 
EUR. L. 573, 590 (2006); Jeffrey A. Brauch, The Margin of Appreciation and the 
Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights: Threat to the Rule of Law, 11 
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 113, 128 (2005) (providing a historical overview of the way the 
margin of appreciation doctrine has been developed in the case law of the ECtHR and 
discussing the way the Court has dealt with the “necessity test”). 
100.  S.A.S. v. France ¶ 78. 
101.  Id.  
102.  Id.; see also DWORKIN, supra note 30, at 130 (arguing that a liberal state 
should not favor or disfavor a particular lifestyle because another lifestyle is 
“intrinsically better.”  It should be left to citizens to decide which way of life better 
suits them).  
103.  S.A.S. v. France ¶ 78.  
104.  Id. ¶¶ 110-112. 
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law.105  The Court elaborates quite extensively on the question of 
whether the French prohibition law pursues a legitimate aim.106  The 
same is true for the legal assessment of the necessity test, which asks: 
is the prohibition law necessary in a democratic society to pursue one 
or more of the legitimate limitation grounds?107 
What does the Court say about the legitimacy of the aim behind the 
prohibition law?  The Court starts by noting that the list of grounds on 
which states could rely on to justify interferences with fundamental 
rights is “exhaustive” and their definition is “restrictive.”108  Meaning, 
the Court refrains from applying an extensive interpretation method to 
interpret the limitation grounds in light of an alleged violation of 
fundamental rights.109 
In order to rule on whether there is a legitimate ground for the 
prohibition law, the Court draws on the justification provided by the 
French authorities in favor of the law.110  The authorities have argued 
the ban pursues two goals.  First, it aims to protect public safety.111  
Second, it aims to enforce respect for the minimum set of values of an 
open and democratic society.112  The Court concludes that the latter aim 
does not “expressly” correspond with any of the legitimate limitations 
grounds that are mentioned in the Convention.113  Absent a Convention 
limitation ground, the Court specifies with reference to the explanation 
provided by the French authorities that the second aim behind the 
prohibition law is meant to serve three values.114  The three values are: 
(1) pursing respect for gender equality, (2) pursuing respect for human 
dignity, and (3) pursing respect for the minimum requirements of life 
in society.115 
                                                          
105.  Id. 
106.  Id. ¶¶ 113-122. 
107.  Id. ¶¶ 123-159. 
108.  Id. ¶ 113. 
109.  Id.  
110.  Id. ¶ 110-11 
111.  Id. ¶ 114-115. 
112.  Id. ¶ 114. 
113.  Id.  
114.  Id. ¶ 116. 
115.  Id.  
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At first sight, the Court says that pursuing these three values cannot 
be related to one of the legitimate limitations grounds that are enlisted 
in the ECHR.116 
Nevertheless, the Court relies on the French government’s 
argument, which suggests ensuring respect for the minimum set of 
values of an open and democratic society as part of the legitimate 
limitation ground of protecting the rights and freedoms of others.117  In 
doing so, the Court first examines and rejects the gender-equality 
argument. 
According to the Court, this gender argument is ill-founded to 
pursue protection of the rights and freedoms of others as ultimate 
justification for the prohibition law.118  In this context, the Court refers 
to women who insist to wear this type of clothing in public for religious 
purpose and as a matter of personal choice.119  In other words, the treaty 
does not allow the limiting of people’s basic liberties by an appeal to 
protecting these people from the free exercise of fundamental rights.120 
                                                          
116.  Id. ¶ 117. 
117.  Id.; Id. ¶¶ 81-82. 
118.  Id. ¶ 119.  The court’s rejection of the gender argument is a shift away 
from its own jurisprudence in which the Court repeatedly showed leniency toward the 
gender argument, allowing far reaching restrictions upon free exercise of religion and 
targeting particularly women.  See Deborah L. Rhode, The Injustice of Appearance, 
61 STAN. L. REV. 1033, 1094 (2009); Karima Bennoune, Secularism and Human 
Rights: A Contextual Analysis of Headscarves, Religious Expression, and Women’s 
Equality under International Law, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 367, 382 (2007); 
Benjamin Bleiberg, Unveiling the Real Issue: Evaluating the European Court of 
Human Rights’ Decision to Enforce the Turkish Headscarf Ban in Leyla Sahin v. 
Turkey, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 129 (2005).  Interestingly enough, the Government’s 
gender argument in favor of the ban was later debunked by empirical findings.  See 
Eva Brems, Face Veil Bans in the European Court of Human Rights: The Importance 
of Empirical Findings, 22 J.L. & POL’Y 517, 551 (2014) (purporting that some of 
women who cover their faces “express assertive emancipated views against traditional 
role patterns and against unequal gender practices in the Muslim community,” 
concluding that “the face veil is not an indicator of its wearer’s approval of male 
dominance, let alone of its promotion.”). 
119.  Id. ¶ 125. 
120.  Id. ¶ 119 (the Court held: “a State Party cannot invoke gender equality in 
order to ban a practice that is defended by women . . . in the context of the exercise of 
the rights enshrined in those provisions, unless it were to be understood that 
individuals could be protected on that basis from the exercise of their own 
fundamental rights and freedoms.”). 
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With regard to the argument that the prohibition law aims to pursue 
respect for human dignity, this noble ground does not justify “a blanket 
ban” on face-covering dresses in public, despite the fact that this piece 
of clothing is considered “strange” by many people in the society.121  
The argument is that this “expression of a cultural identity” is crucial 
for the maintenance of pluralism,122 which is according to the Court in 
favor of the whole democracy.123 
When it comes to the assessment of the third value, respect for the 
minimum requirements of life in society (that is synonymous to “living 
together”), the Court very briefly says that pursuing this value might 
fall under the scope of the legitimate limitation ground of protecting the 
rights and freedoms of others.124  In this regard, the Court engages with 
the French position—that considers an unveiled face in public as an 
indispensable tool for social interaction.125  The Court reaches the 
following conclusion: 
It can understand the view that individuals who are present in places 
open to all may not wish to see practices or attitudes developing there 
which would fundamentally call into question the possibility of open 
interpersonal relationships, which, by virtue of an established 
consensus, forms an indispensable element of community life within 
the society in question.  The Court is therefore able to accept that the 
barrier raised against others by a veil concealing the face is perceived 
by the respondent State as breaching the right of others to live in a space 
of socialisation which makes living together easier.  That being said, in 
view of the flexibility of the notion of “living together” and the resulting 
risk of abuse, the Court must engage in a careful examination of the 
necessity of the impugned limitation.126 
After having concluded that the French prohibition law constitutes 
an interference, which is prescribed by law and also pursues a legitimate 
aim, the Court starts examining the necessity of the legitimate limitation 
                                                          
121.  Id. ¶ 120.  
122.  Id. 
123.  Id. 
124.  Id. ¶ 122. 
125.  Id. 
126.  Id. 
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in a democratic society.127  In this regard, the Court first reiterates its 
standard interpretation of religious freedom, noting that: 
[F]reedom of thought, conscience and religion is one of the 
foundations of a “democratic society” within the meaning of the 
Convention.  This freedom is, in its religious dimension, one of the 
most vital elements that go to make up the identity of believers and 
their conception of life, but it is also a precious asset for atheists, 
agnostics, sceptics and the unconcerned.  The pluralism indissociable 
from a democratic society, which has been dearly won over the 
centuries, depends on it.  That freedom entails, inter alia, freedom to 
hold or not to hold religious beliefs and to practise or not to practise 
a religion.128 
However, the Court has also ruled that limitations upon free 
exercise of religious freedom are at some points justified as a tool “to 
reconcile the interests of the various groups and ensure that everyone’s 
beliefs are respected.”129  This asks judges to “balance between the 
fundamental rights of each individual which constitutes the foundation 
of a ‘democratic society.’”130  This judicial balance should not frustrate 
the decision making process that has democratic legitimacy.  The Court 
admits at this point that it has a “subsidiary role” in assessing whether 
particular restrictions upon fundamental rights in democratic societies 
are necessary.131  This is because the Court views the sovereign states 
are “in principle better placed than an international court to evaluate 
local needs and conditions.”132 
                                                          
127.  Id. ¶ 124. 
128.  Id. 
129.  Id. ¶ 126. 
130.  Id. ¶ 128. 
131.  Id. ¶ 129. 
132.  Id.; see Brauch, supra note 99 (for more information on “the better placed 
argument”).  See also Patricia Popelier & Catherine van de Heyning, Subsidiarity 
Post-Brighton: Procedural Rationality as Answer, 30 LJIL 5 (2017) (analyzing how 
the ECtHR has dealt with the principle of subsidiarity, comparing the period before 
and after the so-called “Brighton” declaration that aimed to reinforce the idea that 
national States are in a better position to deal with the proper protection of 
fundamental rights); Alastair Mowbray, Subsidiarity and the European Convention 
on Human Rights, 15 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 313 (2015) (using a quantitative research 
method to analyze the subsidiarity principle); Matthew Saul, The European Court of 
Human Rights’ Margin of Appreciation and the Processes of National Parliaments, 
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This is especially the case, the Court found, when it faces questions 
of law and religion.133  Hence, the Court ruled that in such cases, “the 
role of the domestic policy-maker should be given special weight.”134  
In such cases, the Court grants states a wider “margin of 
appreciation,”135 in assessing whether the legitimate limitation upon a 
particular freedom can undergo the necessity test.136  To examine this 
properly, the Court must determine whether there is “consensus” 
amongst the member states of the ECHR concerning the need to impose 
certain limitations upon the exercise of a freedom.137  This margin of 
appreciation does not provide states a carte blanche, rather it “goes 
hand in hand with a European supervision embracing both the law and 
the decisions applying it.  The Court’s task is to determine whether the 
                                                          
15 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 745, 751 (2015) (providing an explanation for the subsidiarity 
principle, referring to the democratic legitimacy of nation Sates, the state of art with 
regard to a particular limitation amongst the States and the domestic expertise that an 
international Court generally lacks). 
133.  S.A.S. v. France ¶ 129. 
134.  Id. ¶ 129.  See also Robert F. Cochran, Jr. & Michael A. Helfand, The 
Competing Claims of Law and Religion: Who Should Influence Whom?, 39 PEPP. L. 
REV. 1051, 1052 (2013) (on the continuous and “endless jousting” between law and 
religion).  
135.  In short, this doctrine entails that the Court grants the State certain room 
to develop its own policies.  That room—the margin of appreciation—might be wider 
(i.e., the Court is less restrictive) in cases concerning subjects that state parties are 
“better placed” to deal with or issues where state parties respond differently to, the 
so-called “no-consensus” argument. 
136.  S.A.S. v. France ¶ 129; see also Aaron R. Petty, Religion, Conscience, 
and Belief in the European Court of Human Rights, 48 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 
807, 824 (2016). 
137.  Id.; see Brauch, supra note 99, at 126-27 (identifying two key-factors that 
help to define the scope of the margin of appreciation: “[first,] a balancing of the 
importance of the right with the importance of the restriction, [second] the existence 
of a European consensus on the matter before the Court.”); Peter Cumper & Tom 
Lewis, Empathy and Human Rights: The Case of Religious Dress, 18 HUM. RTS. L. 
REV. 61, 69 (2018) (arguing that consensus amongst the member States generally 
leads to a narrower margin of appreciation).  Cf. Ryan Thoreson, The Limits of Moral 
Limitations: Reconceptualizing Morals in Human Rights Law, 59 HARV. INT’L L.J. 
197, 217 (2018) (giving the example of restrictions and limitations upon adult same-
sex activities and illustrating how growing consensus amongst member States led to 
a narrower margin of appreciation in finding justification for such limitations). 
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measures taken at national level were justified in principle and 
proportionate.”138 
In addition to the analysis above, the Court also examined the 
necessity of the ban in light of the public safety argument.139  In a more 
general note, the Court found that restrictions upon religious freedom 
for security reasons are, under some circumstances, necessary in a 
democratic society.140  However, the Court did not see any reason to 
consider the prohibition law as a legitimate limitation that aims to deal 
with an immediate security threat.141  For instance, the Court considered 
that the authorities could have chosen a less restrictive measure, such 
as requiring women to take off their veils at places that are constantly 
under high pressure of security threats.142  Hence, the Court ruled that 
the interference caused by the prohibition law cannot be justified in a 
democratic society on the ground of pursuing public safety.143 
The Court then assessed the necessity of the French prohibition law 
in light of the second justification provided by the authorities: 
considering the ban as ensuring the “living together” ideal.144  Against 
the backdrop of the weight French authorities have given to ensure a 
particular way of “living together,” the Court was sensitive to the 
argument that states should be given room “to secure the conditions 
whereby individuals can live together in their diversity.”145  Hence, the 
                                                          
138.  S.A.S. v. France ¶ 131.  See Letsas, supra note 99, at 711 (claiming that 
the proportionality question “is by far the most important and most demanding 
criterion for whether the limitation of a right was permissible under the Convention.”).  
Cf. Rosamund Scott, Reproductive Health: Morals, Margins and Rights, 81 MOD. L. 
REV. 422, 425 (2018) (arguing that the proportionality test “underlies the assessment 
of necessity and the Convention as a whole,” which in turn requires a proper 
assessment “between the interests and rights of the individual and those of the 
community, including the public interest.”). 
139.  S.A.S. v. France ¶ 137 (rejecting first the claim that the prohibition law 
was meant “to protect women against a practice which was imposed on them or would 
be detrimental to them.”). 
140.  Id. 
141.  Id. 
142.  Id. 
143.  Id. 
144.  Id. ¶ 140 (the value of respect for the minimum requirements of life in 
society is amongst the three values of the broader goal pursuing respect for the 
minimum set of values of an open and democratic society). 
145.  Id. ¶ 141.  
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Court found the interference upon religious freedom “justified in its 
principle solely” because it aims to shape the contours of “living 
together” in the French society.146 
With regard to the democratic necessity of imposing a ban on 
wearing face-covering veils in public that aims to ensure “living 
together,” the Court admitted that this ban might “seem excessive,” 
because it is designed to target a very small group who wants to cover 
their face in public.147  Furthermore, the Court emphasized that it is 
aware of the fact that: 
[T]he ban has a significant negative impact on the situation of 
women who, like the applicant, have chosen to wear the full-face veil 
for reasons related to their beliefs.  As stated previously, they are thus 
confronted with a complex dilemma, and the ban may have the effect 
of isolating them and restricting their autonomy, as well as impairing 
the exercise of their freedom to manifest their beliefs and their right 
to respect for their private life.  It is also understandable that the 
women concerned may perceive the ban as a threat to their 
identity.148 
Although the Court acknowledged that many human rights groups 
have objected to the French prohibition law as “disproportionate,”149 
and that some voices consider this law “islamaphobic,”150 the Judges 
ruled they are not in the position to intervene in domestic political 
debates that result in limitations of fundamental rights.151  Nevertheless, 
the Court reiterated that: 
[A] State which enters into a [sensitive] legislative process . . . takes 
the risk of contributing to the consolidation of the stereotypes which 
affect certain categories of the population and of encouraging the 
                                                          
146.  Id. ¶ 142. 
147.  Id.  
148.  Id. ¶ 146.  
149.  Id. ¶ 147.  
150.  Id. ¶ 149. 
151.  Id. (ruling that “[it] is admittedly not for the Court to rule on whether 
legislation is desirable in such matters.”) 
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expression of intolerance, when it has a duty, on the contrary, to 
promote tolerance.152 
The Court also noted that the prohibition law was not designed to 
protest against the “religious connotation” of face-covering veils.153  
Rather, the ban is “solely” meant to combat the concealment of the 
face.154  At the same time, the Court admitted that the ban leads to a 
decrease of pluralism in the French society.155  By situating itself as 
such, the Court is not refrained from being genuinely sympathetic about 
the French struggle in this case, which seeks to protect and ensure: 
[A] principle of interaction between individuals, which in its view is 
essential for the expression not only of pluralism, but also of 
tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no democratic 
                                                          
152.  Id. (the Court also says “that remarks which constitute a general, vehement 
attack on a religious or ethnic group are incompatible with the values of tolerance, 
social peace and non-discrimination which underlie the Convention and do not fall 
within the right to freedom of expression that it protects.”). 
153.  Id. ¶ 151. 
154.  Id.  However, neutralizing the ban as merely a legal project that is not 
singling out religious face-covering dresses in public qua religious is a gross denial 
of the parliamentary history behind this ban.  The history attests to the fact the ban 
was certainly designed to stop Muslim women from wearing face-covering dresses.  
The arguments used by the French Minister of Justice defending this ban in the 
Assemblée nationale, leave no ambiguity about this.  She argues the French style of 
Islam respects French laws and she refers to the role Imams will play in explaining 
the prohibition law to their worshippers and community.  In addition, the many 
exceptions the law makes for other groups to cover their faces, either for religious or 
non-religious purposes, clearly reveals that the prohibition not only aimed to single 
out the burqa and niqab for a special ban, but also introduces a French Islam that is 
compatible with the ideal of “living together.”  See Assemblée nationale, supra note 
78, at 5417; see also Sofie G. Syed, Liberte, Egalite, Vie Privee: The Implications of 
France’s Anti-Veil Laws for Privacy and Autonomy, 40 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 301, 
306 (2017); W. Cole Jr. Durham & Alexander Dushku, Traditionalism, Secularism, 
and the Transformative Dimension of Religious Institutions, 1993 BYU L. REV. 421, 
450 (1993) (discussing how seemingly neutral laws affect religious minorities: “The 
major problem is that any neutral, generally applicable law, however insignificant and 
ill-conceived, can trump religious liberty.  This places smaller religious groups that 
lack significant political influence at constant risk of having their religious freedom 
rights violated by an intolerant or inadvertently insensitive majority.”).  Cf. R. J. 
Delahunty, Does Animal Welfare Trump Religious Liberty? The Danish Ban on 
Kosher and Halal Butchering, 16 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 341 (2015). 
155.  S.A.S. v. France ¶ 149. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3385444 
Wahedi camera ready (Do Not Delete) 5/8/2019  12:02 PM 
2019]  FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND LIVING TOGETHER 245 
society . . . It can thus be said that the question whether or not it 
should be permitted to wear the full-face veil in public places 
constitutes a choice of society.156 
Against this backdrop, the Court refrained from making a value 
judgment about how the French decided to establish and maintain their 
society.  The criticism entailed that “such review will lead it to assess a 
balance that has been struck by means of a democratic process within 
the society in question.”157  Thus, in cases characterized by a high 
amount of sensitivity and polarization, the primacy lies with the 
national legislator.  This means France has a broad margin of 
appreciation to decide upon the admissibility of face-covering dresses 
in public, in light of the “living together” ideal that it aims to ensure.  
To justify this wide margin, the Court referred to the lack of consensus 
amongst its member states with regard to the legality of face-covering 
veils.158 
The Court reasoned that given the broad margin of appreciation 
France has in this case, the interference on religious freedom caused by 
the prohibition law, pursues a legitimate aim.159  This legitimate aim 
ensures “living together” as part of protecting the rights and freedoms 
of others.  This legitimate limitation is, according to the Court, 
necessary in a democratic society.160  Therefore, there was no violation 
of religious freedom or any other right.161  This way of reasoning 
revealed that the margin of appreciation doctrine is very sensitive 
toward reinforcing majoritarianism that effectively advances a 
particular political agenda.162 
                                                          
156.  Id. ¶ 154. 
157.  Id. 
158.  Id. ¶ 156. 
159.  Id. ¶ 157. 
160.  Id. ¶ 158. 
161.  Id. ¶¶ 156-159. 
162.  For example, the Court held that it needs to be restrained in opining about 
the lawfulness of “matters of general policy, on which opinions within a democratic 
society may reasonably differ widely.”  In such cases, the Court says, “the role of the 
domestic policy-maker should be given special weight.”  See id. ¶ 154.  This facially 
neutral consideration is problematic for many reasons.  But most importantly, it is 
problematic because the Court neglects its main task: giving protection to 
subordinated and marginalized people who seek protection under the law.  Drawing 
on technical reasoning that gives majorities a wide margin of discretion effectively 
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B. “Majoritarian-proof” Making of Diversity 
How can we understand the “abrupt” endorsement of “living 
together” in S.A.S.? 163  The adoption of this novel legitimate limitation 
ground on religious freedom reveals the use of a majoritarian lens and 
language to eventually decide the admissibility of contentious and norm 
deviant practices of minorities.164  This approach immediately 
implicates that majoritarian ideas about the acceptability of contentious 
religious manifestations, such as wearing face-covering veils in public, 
matter very much in the justification of imposed restrictions upon 
“unwelcome” practices of religious groups.  This reinforces and 
legitimizes the search, construction and maintenance of a collective 
cultural identity.165  In other words, pursing and developing a shared 
narrative about the roots and character of the society, either secular or 
Judeo-Christian, results in “majoritarianism.”166  This majoritarian 
narrative aims to protect the native “national” identity that tells us more 
about “who we are.”  The construction of this “common background” 
                                                          
advances their political agenda.  See also Trump v. Hawaii 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018) 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (rightly pointing out that the judiciary must correct 
political branches of power when they obviously neglect constitutional rights). 
163.  Cf. Kristin Henrard, Exploring the Potential (Contribution) of Multi-
Disciplinary Legal Research for the Analysis of Minorities’ Rights, 8 ERASMUS L. 
REV. 111, 120 (2015) (criticizing the way the Court has assessed the different interests 
in S.A.S., speaking of a poorly motivated decision).  
164.  LABORDE, supra note 39, at 33 (speaks about the decisiveness of majorities 
sensitivities for the acceptability of minorities’ practices); Joppke, supra note 23, at 
95-99 (discussing the preference for the preserve of the majoritarian practices in the 
case law of the ECtHR); Saba Mahmood, Religious Reason and Secular Affect: An 
Incommensurable Divide?, in TALAL ASAD ET AL. (EDS.), IS CRITIQUE SECULAR? 
BLASPHEMY, INJURY, AND FREE SPEECH 79 (2009) (discussing how “majoritarian 
cultural sensibilities” challenge the beliefs and practices of Muslim minorities across 
Europe).  
165.  Trotter, supra note 61, at 169. 
166.  Cf. Ratna Kapur, The Ayodhya Case: Hindu Majoritarianism and the 
Right to Religious Liberty, 29 MD. J. INT’L L. 305, 307 (2014) (discussing how a local 
Indian court’s judgment has contributed to the establishment of “Hindu 
Majoritarianism,” affecting the rights of the Muslim minority).  Cf. also Loren E. 
Mulraine, Religious Freedom: The Original Civil Liberty, 61 HOWARD L.J. 147, 149 
(2017) (defending religious liberty and warning against the rise of nationalism that 
threatens this fundamental liberty).  See also Bridgette Dunlap, Protecting the Space 
to Be Unveiled: Why France’s Full Veil Ban Does Not Violate the European 
Convention on Human Rights, 35 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 968 (2012). 
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leads to the immediate accusation of “disloyalty” for those who do not 
share the majoritarian narrative, or who cannot comply with 
majoritarian expectations about how one should live a life.167  Hence, 
reinforcing majoritarianism advances ethnocentrism.  This shift reduces 
the free exercise of fundamental rights for minorities who do not fit the 
perfect majoritarian picture.168 
A timely example of the endorsement and reinforcement of 
majoritarianism is the Court’s ruling in S.A.S., which uniquely justifies 
its legitimate limitation ground against religious freedom in the pursuit 
of “living together.”169  This expansion of the limitation grounds is 
                                                          
167.  Indeed, the dominant idea suggests: who can be against the dominant 
narrative that tells us more about “who we are”?  Cf. Beydoun, supra note 10, at 1764 
(discussing how some have labeled U.S. Muslims as disloyal in the post-9/11 terrorist 
attacks era); Sahar F. Aziz, Coercive Assimilationism: The Perils of Muslim Women’s 
Identity Performance in the Workplace, 20 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1, 39 (2014) 
(elaborating on how Muslim women in the U.S. have been accused of “disloyalty” 
because of their extant Islamic appearance, such as wearing headscarves); David 
Smith, Presumed Suspect: Post-9/11 Intelligence Gathering, Race, and the First 
Amendment, 11 UCLA J. ISLAMIC & NEAR E. L. 85, 120 (2012) (describing the logic 
used by authorities that result in considering Muslims as “disloyal”); Nagwa Ibrahim, 
The Origins of Muslim Racialization in U.S. Law, 7 UCLA J. ISLAMIC & NEAR E. L. 
121, 142 (2008) (arguing how the “racialization” of Muslims as disloyal citizens have 
created “a new zone of lawlessness where they are neither citizen nor alien, but rather 
belong to [the] inherently evil world called “Islam.”“).  See also Nehal Bhuta, Two 
Concepts of Religious Freedom in the European Court of Human Rights, 113 S. 
ATLANTIC Q. 9, 25 (2014) (discussing ECtHR case law, framing Islamic headscarves 
as incompatible with democratic values). 
168.  See generally Wahedi, supra note 45; LABORDE, supra note 39; Joppke, 
supra note 23; Kapur, supra note 166; Mahmood, supra note 164 (sharing the point 
of view that using majoritarian standards in the legal assessment of minority practices 
results in an asymmetrical toleration regime: merciful for the majority and stingy in 
granting exemptions to religious minorities). 
169.  However, the outcome of the case is not surprising nor unique.  It was 
even predictable as it fits a notorious line of jurisprudence that has been set out by the 
ECtHR, which is not merciful but stingy toward the habits and beliefs of the Muslim 
minority in Europe.  See LABORDE, supra note 39, at 33 (“The European Court of 
Human Rights freedom of religion jurisprudence has notoriously been lenient toward 
practices of Christian establishment and overtly intolerant toward the presence of 
Islam in the public sphere.”); see generally Keturah A. Dunner, Addressing Religious 
Intolerance in Europe: The Limited Application of Article 9 of the European 
Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 30 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 117 
(1999).  In other words, S.A.S. fits the overall Islamophobic case law of the ECtHR, 
which is part of an Islamophobic atmosphere that is currently dominating debates on 
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thought-provoking and prone to criticism.170  What does the normative 
attitude of the Court in S.A.S. tell us about the role of religion in liberal 
political philosophy?171 
1. The Prohibition Law and Majoritarianism 
Does the judgment reflect support for the French struggle of 
ensuring and reinforcing the minimum requirements of life in society 
thereby backing “living together” in a French style?172  In addition, does 
                                                          
migration and the place of Islam in Western democracies.  See Wahedi, supra note 22 
(describing Islamophobia merely as the fear for the Islam and Muslims and providing 
some recent examples of this tendency); see generally MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, THE 
NEW RELIGIOUS INTOLERANCE: OVERCOMING THE POLITICS OF FEAR IN AN ANXIOUS 
AGE (2012) (discussing the contemporary fear toward religious minorities, 
particularly the Muslim minority, in the Western world); Martha C. Nussbaum, In 
Defense of Universal Values, 36 IDAHO L. REV. 379 (2000).  
170.  The Court’s expansion of the legitimate limitation grounds is one of the 
most prominent points of criticisms toward the judgment in S.A.S. Cf. Brett G. 
Scharffs, Islam and Religious Freedom: The Experience of Religious Majorities and 
Minorities, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. ONLINE 78, 96 (2018) (saying that the 
justification of the ban on grounds of “living together” has been criticized as 
expansion of the legitimate limitation grounds). 
171.  The central question of this liberal paradigm is: what role does religion 
play for the purposes of religious accommodation and justification of public policies?  
See Wahedi, supra note 45 (claiming that religion is not a unique protection-worthy 
category qua religion within the paradigm of liberal political philosophy); LABORDE, 
supra note 39 (discussing the emphasis on egalitarianism in contemporary liberal 
theories of religious freedom and calling upon legal philosophers to think about 
religion as an interpretive concept); LABORDE & BARDON, supra note 39, at 1-5 
(identifying four types of debates concerning the question of religion in liberal 
political philosophy.  First, the debate concerning the specialness of religion for legal 
purposes.  Second, the religion neutrality debate.  Third, the question of religious 
accommodation.  Fourth, the debate on the relationship between religion and 
comparable, though non-sectarian categories, such as conscience and identity); Carlo 
Invernizzi Accetti, Religious Truth and Democratic Freedom, in RELIGION, 
SECULARISM, AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 293-94 (Jean Louise Cohen & 
Cécile Laborde eds., 2016) (criticizing and providing an explanation for why within 
the paradigm of liberal political philosophy religious arguments are systematically 
labelled as inadmissible or reformulated in neutral terms). 
172.  Thus, does the S.A.S. judgment strengthen “forced assimilation” of French 
citizens who do not have a “native” French background, through allowing 
mechanisms that encourage minorities to adopt the majoritarian French lifestyle?  See 
Syed, supra note 154, at 303 (qualifying the prohibition law as “assimilationist”); see 
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this jurisprudential expansion force minorities to follow the 
majoritarian choice of society,173 providing little room for the habits, 
traditions, and ideas that diverge from this majoritarian norm?174  In 
sum, how does the Court’s judgment in S.A.S. fit the tendency of 
reinforcing majoritarianism and what does this mean for diversity and 
free exercise of religion?175  To answer this question, we need to clarify 
which majoritarian ideas the Court has embraced and reinforced.  The 
search for this answer helps us in two ways.  First, it enables us to 
develop a theoretical framework we can use to embed the Court’s 
approach.  Second, it helps us to map the implications of the 
endorsement of majoritarianism for diversity and the free exercise of 
religion.176  To conceptualize the Court’s decision in S.A.S. we need to 
focus on the arguments used by the judges to justify the expansion of 
the limitation grounds with “living together,” resulting in the 
justification of the imposed ban on wearing face-covering dresses in 
public. 
Although, the Court’s reasoning is meandering in this respect and 
often very contradictory, the overall outcome of this case affirms the 
large body of criticism that accuses the Court of being “overtly 
intolerant toward the presence of Islam in the public sphere.”177  This 
                                                          
also Yusuf, supra note 69, at 284 (claiming that S.A.S. reinforces policies that are 
meant to assimilate minorities). 
173.  S.A.S. v. France ¶¶ 153-154 (the question of having or not a ban on 
wearing face-covering dresses in public concerns a “choice of society.”  The Court 
says in this respect that it “has a duty to exercise a degree of restraint in its review of 
Convention compliance, since such review will lead it to assess a balance that has 
been struck by means of a democratic process within the society in question.”) 
174.  See LARBODE, supra note 39, at 33; Daly, supra note 27, at 165 (criticizing 
the use of majoritarian standards as yardstick in assessing the admissibility of minority 
practices). 
175.  Cf. Trotter, supra note 61, at 169 (warning for the shift toward a collective 
culture that is little merciful toward the religious demands of minorities, analyzing the 
post-”living together” judgments). 
176.  See Kapur, supra note 166, at 307. 
177.  LABORDE, supra note 39, at 33; Bhuta, supra note 167, at 26 (arguing that 
the ECtHR provides more room for majoritarian practices, while it adopts a militant 
secularist approach in assessing the legality of minority practices—in particular with 
regard to headscarves—resulting in the “equation of Islamic religious practices with 
intolerance, discrimination, and inequality,” which obviously do not deserve 
protection under the Convention).  See generally Wahedi, supra note 45; Joppke, 
supra note 23. 
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theoretical critique provides a fruitful insight in the general attitude of 
the Court toward contentious religious practices of a non-native 
minority.  Therefore, this critique also helps to conceptualize the 
Court’s decision in S.A.S—paving the way toward conceptualizing the 
Court’s approach toward diversity. 
This part argues that justifying far-reaching restrictions upon 
religious freedom with an appeal on “living together” aims to make 
diversity, as a concept, majoritarian-proof.  That is to say: what is 
considered protection-worthy under “diversity” depends on 
majoritarian sensitivities, standards, and ideas about how people in a 
society should behave and live.178 
Making diversity majoritarian-proof is meant to pass hard cases 
regarding the legality of contentious practices through the skeptical and 
critical lens of the majority, which aims to promote its own narrative.  
This results in an asymmetrical toleration regime: protective toward the 
rights, habits, and beliefs of the “native” majority, but intolerant, 
reactionary, and aggressive toward the exemption claims of “non-
native” minorities, such as Muslims.179  What evidence do we have to 
                                                          
178.  See Mahmood, supra note 164, at 68.  
179.  See generally Wahedi, supra note 22.  See Mahmood, supra note 164 at 
86 (referring to Peter G. Danchin and discussing the criticism that qualifies the ECtHR 
attitude as “hypocritical,” allegedly protecting the Christian majority, and being 
intolerant toward the Muslim minority); Peter G. Danchin, Of Prophets and 
Proselytes: Freedom of Religion and the Conflict of Rights in International Law, 49 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 249, at 275 (2008) (referring to critics of the ECtHR case law and 
concluding that “there appears to be a bias in the jurisprudence of the Court under 
article 9 toward protecting traditional and established religions and a corresponding 
insensitivity toward the rights of minority, nontraditional, or unpopular religious 
groups.”); see also Samuel Moyn, Religious Freedom and the Fate of Secularism, in 
RELIGION, SECULARISM, AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 27 (Jean Louise Cohen 
& Cécile Laborde eds., 2016) (asking rhetorically with respect to the systematically 
different legal treatment of Islamic cases before the ECtHR: “Do the cases . . . reflect 
a Christian Islamophobia in the principled garb of secularism?”); Bhuta, supra note 
167, at 26 (criticizing the double standard that is seemingly used by the ECtHR to 
assess the admissibility of the manifestations of Muslims and Christians.  “When it 
comes to Christian religious values, their potential inconsistency with democracy, 
equality, and tolerance is never in doubt, revealing sharply the degree to which this 
line of cases rests not on a thoroughgoing rationalist secularism but on a political 
theology of Christian democracy in which the identity of democratic values with an 
imagined Christian civilizational tradition is unquestioned.”).  For a similar argument 
raised in the United States, see Robert L. McFarland, Are Religious Arbitration Panels 
Incompatible with Law: Examining Overlapping Jurisdictions in Private Law, 4 
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claim that the Court has interpreted the limitation grounds upon 
religious freedom in a way that makes diversity ultimately 
“majoritarian proof?” 
For the answer to this question we need to briefly recall the 
objectives of the French prohibition law.  This discursive approach 
helps us see how the Court’s endorsement of “living together” through 
an extensive interpretation of the legitimate limitation ground that 
attempts to protect the rights and freedoms of others has actually 
resulted in the reinforcement of majoritarianism.180  In other words, 
attempting to protect the rights and freedoms of others is making 
diversity majoritarian-proof.  The historical background of the 
prohibition law reveals that the ban has been considered necessary to: 
protect French secularism, rescue women who are victims of gender-
inequality, and reaffirm fraternalism; as the full-face veil constitutes a 
breach of the French style of “living together” in public.181  In short, the 
veil has been considered a sectarian “rejection of the values of the 
Republic,” which makes social interaction impossible.182 
The French authorities defended the limitation this law posed upon 
religious freedom as necessary for national security, and defending the 
rights and freedoms of others, which should guarantee a minimum 
amount of respect for the values of an open and democratic society.183  
The majoritarian argument suggests that face-covering veils do not 
belong to the “real” France, as these pieces of clothing make open 
communication impossible.  The “true” Frenchman respects equality, 
human dignity, and is willing to interact socially in public.184  The veil 
allegedly contradicts this majoritarian tradition. 
However, the Court convincingly debunked the national security 
arguments,185 and most of the arguments relating to the protection of 
the rights and freedoms of others, such as the gender-equality 
                                                          
FAULKNER L. REV. 367, 371 (2013) (criticizing the stinginess of those who defend 
religious arbitration, but do not want to extend that right to Muslims). 
180.  For a comparable method applied to reach the same conclusion, compare 
Kapur, supra note 166, at 307.  
181.  S.A.S. v. France ¶¶ 17; 24-25. 
182.  Id. ¶ 25. 
183.  Id. ¶ 82. 
184.  Cf. id. ¶ 25. 
185.  Id. ¶ 139. 
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argument186 and the human dignity argument.187  Nevertheless, the 
Court interpreted the protection argument to justify the imposition of 
far reaching restrictions upon the free exercise of religious freedom 
with an appeal on ensuring the French style of “living together.”188  At 
first sight, this extensive interpretation of the Court is not only very 
remarkable but also very problematic because it reinforces 
majoritarianism and establishes ethnocentrism. 
The Court’s endorsement of “living together” is only remarkable in 
light of the Court’s arguments discussing the legitimacy of the ban’s 
aims and its necessity in a democratic society.  As such, the Court has 
countlessly reaffirmed the importance and the value of pluralism and 
tolerance in democratic societies that are seemingly endangered by the 
prohibition law.189  The Court also shared its concerns of animosity 
toward religious minorities at different points and called upon all parties 
involved to look for the dialogue instead of clashes and 
confrontation.190  Thus, it is hard to believe the same Court has 
developed an argumentation pattern that contradicts the emphasis on 
tolerance, pluralism, and diversity.  In fact, the Court’s reasoning itself 
is intolerant and disrespectful toward “the other.” 
2. The Reconciliation of Diversity with Majoritarian Sensitivities 
The Court’s argument, as a whole, is contradictory.  On the one 
hand, it emphasizes pluralism, broadmindedness, and the ability to 
develop unique identities.  On the other hand, it shows understanding 
for “an established consensus” about public performance.191  This 
contradictory way of reasoning can only be understood against the 
backdrop of a decisive and proven formula insinuated between the 
Court’s reasoning in S.A.S.  The judges reiterate that: “[in] democratic 
societies, in which several religions coexist within one and the same 
population, it may be necessary to place limitations on freedom to 
                                                          
186.  Id. ¶ 118. 
187.  Id. ¶ 120. 
188.  Id. ¶¶ 142. 
189.  Id. ¶ 128.  
190.  Id. ¶¶ 128; 149; 152. 
191.  Id. ¶ 122. 
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manifest one’s religion or beliefs in order to reconcile the interests of 
the various groups and ensure that everyone’s beliefs are respected.”192 
This reconciliation strategy that aims to protect the rights and 
freedoms of others, generally the majority, has proven to be a very 
effective formula in finding justifications for far-reaching restrictions 
upon free exercise of religion.  As such, in Dahlab v. Switzerland 
(“Dahlab”), although the Court declared the applicant’s complaints 
about violating her right to manifest her religion inadmissible, it 
accepted the idea that wearing headscarves is problematic because this 
practice: 
[A]ppears to be imposed on women by a precept which is laid down 
in the Koran and which, as the Federal Court noted, is hard to square 
with the principle of gender equality.  It therefore appears difficult to 
reconcile the wearing of an Islamic headscarf with the message of 
tolerance, respect for others and, above all, equality and non-
discrimination that all teachers in a democratic society must convey 
to their pupils.193 
With reference to this Dahlab reconciliation formula, the Court in 
Leyla Şahin v. Turkey (“Şahin”) again draws on prejudiced and hostile 
arguments to justify the Turkish ban on wearing religious symbols at 
the university.194  While this ban was still enforced, the Court argued 
that in such places: 
[W]here the values of pluralism, respect for the rights of others and, 
in particular, equality before the law of men and women are being 
taught and applied in practice, it is understandable that the relevant 
authorities should wish to preserve the secular nature of the 
institution concerned and so consider it contrary to such values to 
allow religious attire, including, as in the present case, the Islamic 
headscarf, to be worn.195 
The Court used a very similar argument in its merciless judgments 
in Dahlab and Şahin to help reconstruct the Court’s logic in S.A.S., 
                                                          
192.  Id. ¶ 126. 
193.  Dahlab v. Switzerland, ECthr at 13 (2001). 
194.  Leyla Şahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 116; 111 
(2005) (addressing the reconciliation formula of Dahlab). 
195.  Id. 
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resulting in the endorsement of “living together” as a legitimate 
limitation ground against the free exercise of religion.  The Court stated 
that 
[it] can understand the view that individuals who are present in 
places open to all may not wish to see practices or attitudes 
developing there which would fundamentally call into question the 
possibility of open interpersonal relationships, which, by virtue of an 
established consensus, forms an indispensable element of 
community life within the society in question.196 
Reconciling diversity questions—dealing with inclusiveness—
with majoritarian sensitivities relating to integration and assimilation of 
minority groups is not helpful “to hold the coordinate branches to 
account when they defy our most sacred legal commitments.”197  
Furthermore, as these cases have revealed, reconciling diversity with 
majoritarian sensitives equates to “blindly accepting the Government’s 
misguided invitation to sanction [discriminatory policies] motivated by 
animosity toward a disfavored group, all in the name of a superficial 
claim of [for example] national security, gender-equality or living 
together.”198 
3. The Reinforcement of Majoritarianism 
The Court in S.A.S. v. France accepted that wearing full face-
covering veils is a breach of the right to live together with others, which 
“under certain conditions,” can be related to the limitation ground that 
aims to protect the rights and freedoms of others.199  Thus, the Court 
found that in this case the veil is the trouble maker, as it does not fit a 
protection-worthy “established consensus” about how one should dress 
in public.  The Court reaffirmed the reconciliation formula of Dahlab 
through Sahin,200 and ruled that because the French aim is to ensure 
“living together” through defending and protecting “a principle of 
interaction,” it is not for an international Court to give a value judgment 
                                                          
196.  S.A.S. v. France ¶ 122. 
197.  Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2448 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
198.  Id.  
199.  S.A.S. v. France ¶ 122. 
200.  Id. ¶ 126. 
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about the “choice of society,” which is the exclusive right of French 
citizens.201  The Court uses this reasoning along with the fact that 
European states are very much divided on the legality of wearing face-
covering veils in public to provide France with a wide margin of 
appreciation.202  However, relating the French wide margin of 
appreciation to the legality of face-covering dresses in other European 
states, does little to hide the reconciliation strategy that is clearly 
present in this case.  The application of this strategy results in a 
majoritarian-proof version of diversity.203 
In S.A.S., the majoritarian concern was the incompatibility of the 
burqa and niqab in public with the French lifestyle, or the French way 
of “living together,” which allegedly prescribes an “open visor.”204  The 
Court’s decision in S.A.S. reaffirms and declares the French “open 
visor” theory, a majoritarian narrative about “living together,” as a 
protection worthy category in law.  This “living together” narrative 
could be invoked against the manners of minorities that counter and 
harm the majoritarian narrative about how people should behave in 
public.205 
S.A.S. reinforces majoritarianism in a further way.  The 
endorsement of “living together” promotes the majoritarian narrative, 
which prescribes the conditions under which one can be considered a 
                                                          
201.  Id. ¶¶ 153-154. 
202.  Id. ¶ 155. 
203.  Id. ¶ 128.  It is very confusing to read what the Court says in S.A.S. about 
majoritarian desires in a democratic society: “democracy does not simply mean that 
the views of a majority must always prevail: a balance must be achieved which 
ensures the fair treatment of people from minorities and avoids any abuse of a 
dominant position.”  However, it seems that the Court has operated in another way. 
204.  The concern regarding “the public manners” is illustrated by the fact that 
an overwhelming majority of both chambers previously voted in favor of the 
prohibition law.  See Assemblée nationale, supra note 78; Sénat, supra note 72; see 
also Ralf Michaels, Banning Burqas: The Perspective of Postsecular Comparative 
Law, 28 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 213, 238 (2018) (providing insights into the 
impossibility to reconcile the desire to wear face-covering veils in public with the 
French conception of “living together”). 
205.  Eva Brems, S.A.S. v. France: A Reality Check, 25 NOTTINGHAM L.J. 58, 
70 (2016) (arguing that the Court’s reasoning in S.A.S. “legitimizes a majority banning 
minority expressions from the entire public sphere on the sole basis of an ideological 
position that is the expression of the majority’s culture.”).  Cf. Daly, supra note 27, at 
161 (arguing that the “living together” ideology burdens religious and ethnic 
minorities more than the established majority). 
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real French citizen.  S.A.S. clearly shows that one of the crucial elements 
in this respect is not only the ability to socialize in public, but also 
showing the willingness to do that through an “open visor,” leaving 
little room for those who do not want to socialize publicly.206 
C. The “Sacrifice” of a Fundamental Right 
S.A.S. reinforced majoritarianism through an extensive 
interpretation of the limitation grounds of religious freedom by 
prioritizing the “living together” narrative.  Subsequently, the Court has 
moved away from its traditionally used “religious freedom” 
rationale,207 by reconciling diversity questions with majoritarian 
sensitivities about the acceptability of non-majoritarian practices, such 
as wearing face-covering dresses in public.  This approach ultimately 
favors “the cultural and religious beliefs of the majority population.”208 
The downside of a majoritarian-proof-made-diversity is that non-
native religions are “treated as a second-class religion not entitled to the 
same sort of consideration as the Christian faith.”209  Within this 
framework, the crucifix is allowed for reasons of diversity, as it does 
not counter majoritarian concerns about tolerance or human dignity.  
The Islamic hijab, however, both headscarves and face-covering 
dresses, is not considered a primary matter of diversity—but rather a 
practice that threatens the majoritarian culture about gender equality, 
                                                          
206.  Cf. Jill Marshall, S.A.S. v France: Burqa Bans and the Control or 
Empowerment of Identities, 15 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 377, 385 (2015) (criticizing the 
Court’s willingness to accept the French perception of “living together” that 
necessitates a ban on face-covering veils in public, and “effectively bulldozes a right 
to personal identity unless that identity is acceptable and permissible in the eyes of 
the majority.”). 
207.  The religious freedom rationale considers religious freedom a right that 
promotes pluralism, while enabling human beings to develop unique identities and 
live in accordance with their own conception of life.  See Trispiotis, supra note 37, at 
581 (referring to critics of S.A.S. accusing the Court of having favored majoritarian 
ideas at the expense of religious freedom). 
208.  Mahmood, supra note 164, at 86.  See generally Samuel P. Kovach-Orr, 
Banning the Burka: Indicative of a Legitimate Aim or a Thinly-Veiled Attempt to 
Legislate Religious and Cultural Intolerance, 18 RUTGERS J. L. & RELIGION 89 
(2016). 
209.  Moyn, supra note 179, at 29 (based on an analysis of the ECtHR case law). 
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human dignity, ethical integrity, and tolerance in general.210  This 
reconciliation strategy does not rely “on a thoroughgoing rationalist 
secularism but on a political theology of Christian democracy, in which 
the identity of democratic values with an imagined Christian 
civilizational tradition is unquestioned.”211  This has far-reaching 
consequences for religious liberty, however, as free exercise becomes 
dependent upon the sensitivities of the majority. 
Therefore, does the reinforcement of majoritarianism result in the 
subordination of religious freedom to principles that are designed to 
promote the majoritarian narrative?212  It does.213  The reinforcement of 
the French style of “living together” grossly limits the way people 
develop their personal and unique identities.  It also limits the 
opportunity to pursue a life in accordance with their own beliefs on how 
to present themselves in public.214  In a sense, the Court’s judgment in 
S.A.S. has not only “sacrificed” the free exercise of a very important 
liberty,215 but it has also provided lip service to a majoritarian political 
                                                          
210.  See Syed, supra note 154, at 308 (describing the French perception of the 
Islamic hijab as a symbol of “Muslim oppression from which Muslim women need 
deliverance at the hands of secular actors”); see also Bhuta, supra note 167, at 29 
(“One of the fears concerning Dahlab’s headscarf was that it might invite curious 
questions from pupils leading to a discussion of her religious beliefs and, thereby, a 
risk of offense or coercion of children and their parents.  The crucifix poses no such 
threat, and the possibility that it could stimulate a dialogue about religious beliefs is 
welcomed as conducive to tolerance.”) 
211.  Bhuta, supra note 167, at 26.  See generally Joseph H. H. Weiler, Freedom 
of Religion and Freedom from Religion: The European Model, 65 ME. L. REV. 759 
(2013). 
212.  Joint partly dissenting opinion of Judges Nussberger and Jäderblom in 
S.A.S. v. France ¶ 2 (arguing that “the opinion of the majority . . . sacrifices concrete 
individual rights guaranteed by the Convention to abstract principles.”).  
213.  Syed, supra note 154, at 314 (arguing that the French arguments in favor 
of the prohibition law have supported Islamophobia). 
214.  Cf. S.A.S. v. France ¶ 124 (the “freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion is . . . in its religious dimension, one of the most vital elements that go to 
make up the identity of believers and their conception of life . . . .”). 
215.  Joint partly dissenting opinion of Judges Nussberger and Jäderblom in 
S.A.S. v. France ¶ 2. 
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agenda.216  This agenda has set out its minimum expectations of 
citizenship for its minorities in the receiving society.217 
Through its interpretation of “living together,” the Court has 
advanced a political agenda regarding the role and the place of the Islam 
in liberal democracies.218  This agenda reaffirms the majoritarian 
narrative that tells us who we are and what our binding characteristics 
are, not only historically, but also in terms of building a common future.  
In other words, this agenda reinforces a national and collective identity 
agenda.219  Formulated in this way, the Court’s jurisprudence on the 
                                                          
216.  Id. 
217.  Cf. Kapur, supra note 166, at 311 (illustrating how the legal discourse in 
India reinforced a majoritarian political agenda).  See also Michaels, supra note 204, 
at 238 (arguing that within the French context, the prohibition law should be 
understood as a matter of “a civil duty . . . .  By requiring the Muslim woman to take 
off her face veil, the state creates a positive duty for her to express her belonging to 
the state.”); Stephane Mechoulan, France Bans the Veil: What French Republicanism 
Has to Say about It, 35 B.U. INT’L L.J. 223, 273 (2017); Daly, supra note 27, at 164 
(arguing that the prohibition law can be considered a tool for the purpose of protecting 
a “republican habitus”); Trispiotis, supra note 37, at 591 (quoting Stephanie Berry 
who has argued that the “living together” argument is in favor of a “distinctly 
assimilationist agenda.”); Susan S. M. Edwards, No Burqas We’re French: The Wide 
Margin of Appreciation and the ECtHR Burqa Ruling, 26 DENNING L.J. 246, 258 
(2014) (claiming that S.A.S. reinforces the French assimilation agenda).  
218.  Trispiotis, supra note 37, at 591 (quoting Eva Brems, who has suggested 
that the argument of “living together” in the context of face covering veils reflects 
“the fundamental unease of a large majority of people with the idea of an Islamic face 
veil, and the widespread feeling that this garment is undesirable in ‘our society’.”); 
Myriam Hunter-Henin, Why the French Don’t Like the Burqa: Laïcité, National 
Identity and Religious Freedom, 61 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 613, 615 (2012) (arguing that 
the French ban on both wearing headscarves at school and face-covering veils in 
public are “legal expression of the French sensitivity to the presence of Islam in the 
public sphere.”).  
219.  Michaels, supra note 204, at 215; Trotter, supra note 61, at 169; Syed, 
supra note 154, at 322.  A very recent example of adjusting to the dominant norms is 
present in Osmanoǧlu & Kocabaş v. Switzerland.  In this case, the ECtHR held that 
the Swiss authorities’ denial to exempt Muslim girls from taking part in mixed-school 
swimming does not violate the right to religious freedom.  Here, the judges 
unanimously held that although denial of the exemption request interfered with 
religious freedom, this interference was justified in light of the promotion of pupils’ 
integration into Swiss society.  See Osmanoǧlu & Kocabaş v. Switzerland, App. No. 
29086/12, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2017).  In a similar case, a Muslim pupil had asked the 
Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, the Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG), 
to review a decision of the Federal Administrative Court, the 
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lawfulness of laws that burden Muslim citizens, is difficult to reconcile 
with the notions of tolerance, equality, and respect. 
The same is true for the European Parliament’s recent 
recommendations that singled out Islamic institutions for a disfavored 
treatment qua Islam.  With its proposal to shut down mosques that 
violate the EU’s values and its call to develop education programs that 
can spread a “moderate” version of Islam, the Parliament reinforces 
majoritarianism and advances political Islamophobia that 
institutionalizes Islam and Muslim fear.220  Like the ECtHR, the 
European Parliament has aimed to reconcile “Islam” with majoritarian 
sensitivities about terrorism, radicalization, and security matters in 
general.  This resulted in the European Parliament drafting far-reaching 
proposals that ultimately treat the Islamic faith as a second-class 
religion—instead of a particular conception of life that helps human 
beings to flourish. 
In sum, S.A.S. illustrates how the use of the “living together” 
argument has resulted in limiting the free exercise of religion and the 
reinforcement of a majoritarian political agenda suggesting how people 
should act in public.  Additionally, EU Parliament’s recommendations 
(relying on reconciliation strategy) will have serious consequences for 
                                                          
Bundesverwaltungsgericht (BVerwG).  The BVerwG had ruled that the school 
authorities’ refusal to exempt applicant from joint swimming lessons did not violate 
the right to religious freedom.  The BVerfG did not accept the complaint for 
adjudication, as the petitioner failed to explain convincingly why the burkini could 
not qualify as a religious alternative for other swimming clothes.  See 
Bundesverfassungsgericht, BvR 3237/13, ¶ III.3.aa, Nov. 7, 2016 (Germ.); Sohail 
Wahedi, BVerfG 3237/13, 6 OXFORD J. L. & RELIGION 426 (2017) (on file with 
author).  The problem with this way of reasoning is that the judge sits on the clergy.  
On this specific criticism, see Faizan Mustafa & Jagteshwar Singh Sohi, Freedom of 
Religion in India: Current Issues and Supreme Court Acting as Clergy, 2017 BYU L. 
REV. 915, 953 (2017) (on file with author) (critical of the way the Indian Supreme 
Court has introduced an “essentiality” test that aims to examine which practices do 
belong to a faith, “[elevating] the judiciary to the status of clergy.”). 
220.  EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, supra note 12, recommendation 15 (“Urges the 
Member States to encourage and tolerate only ‘practices of Islam’ that are in full 
accordance with EU values.”); recommendation 17 (“invites the Commission and the 
Member States to develop and fund a network of European religious scholars that can 
spread - and testify to - practices of Islam that are compliant with EU values.”); 
recommendation 20 (“Urges the Member States to close without delay mosques and 
places of worship and ban associations that do not adhere to EU values and incite to 
terrorist offences, hatred, discrimination or violence.”). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3385444 
Wahedi camera ready (Do Not Delete) 5/8/2019  12:02 PM 
260 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 49 
equal treatment of the adherents of different religious groups.  
Therefore, the reconciliation strategy has given diversity a majoritarian 
content, fitting the sensitivities of the established majority and leaving 
little room for unpopular faiths, such as the Islam, and non-majoritarian 
religious manifestations, such as the full-face veil in public.  Thus, such 
religious manifestations fail to satisfy the protection-worthy version of 
diversity that encompasses important liberal democratic values, like 
human dignity and gender equality.221 
II. ABSTRACTION FROM THE RELIGIOUS DIMENSION 
The question is whether this majoritarian-proof-making approach 
to “diversity” is compatible with the egalitarian and non-sectarian 
understanding of religion and religious freedom.  To answer this 
question, this part first outlines the broader context of S.A.S. and the EU 
Parliament’s recommendations, which concerns the question of religion 
in liberal political philosophy.  Second, it develops a theoretical 
framework for religion and religious freedom within the paradigm of 
liberal political philosophy.  Third, this theoretical framework will be 
used to reflect on the reconciliation of “diversity” with the dominant 
view regarding the desirability and legality of “contentious religious 
manifestations.”  The next question asks: is the “reconciliation strategy” 
a paradigmatic expression of recent developments in legal theory and 
liberal political philosophy about the role of “religion” for the 
justification of religious accommodation and public decisions taken in 
law and politics? 
                                                          
221.  Michaels, supra note 204, at 227 (arguing that “regardless of whether the 
face veil is cultural or political or both, classifying it as nonreligious has an advantage: 
if the face veil is not religious, then the woman who wears it cannot invoke freedom 
of religion to do so.  If she has been forced to wear it by family members, then the ban 
provides her with protection.  If she has freely chosen to wear it . . .  then this choice 
is inherently suspicious, because it shows that the woman is either against gender 
equality, or in favor of a politically suspicious movement.”).  See also Siobhán 
O’Grady, After refusing a handshake, a Muslim couple was denied Swiss citizenship, 
WASH. POST (Aug. 18, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2018/08/18/ 
after-refusing-handshake-muslim-couple-was-denied-swiss-citizenship/?noredirect 
=on&utm_term=.74b13ae51014 (reporting about the Swiss denial to grant a Muslim 
couple citizenship after they insisted in their rejection to shake hands with the opposite 
gender).  
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A. Religion in the Paradigm of Liberal Political Philosophy 
The recurring conflict in liberal democracies between competing 
religious demands and established legal norms has resulted in a 
principled debate in legal theory and liberal political philosophy 
regarding the role of religion in law and politics.222  Religious 
manifestations that compete with legal and majoritarian norms of 
liberal democracies have accelerated the need for clarification of the 
question: does religion qua religion deserve any special protection?223  
More specifically, should liberal democracies care about religion qua 
religion for the public justification of decisions taken in law and 
                                                          
222.  Cf. debates on the legality of Islamic veils in public, ritual circumcisions 
of children, ministerial exceptions, mixed school swimming cases and the religious 
slaughter cases.  See Mechoulan, supra note 217 (contextualizing the French 
prohibition law); Trotter, supra note 61 (analyzing how the “living together” 
argument has played a role in a couple of recent judgments); Wahedi, supra note 54 
(discussing the “double standards” argument in the debate on the legality of ritual 
circumcisions); Yasmine Ergas, Regulating Religion Beyond Borders, in RELIGION, 
SECULARISM, AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 66 (Jean Louise Cohen & Cécile 
Laborde eds., 2016) (discussing the legality of female circumcision from a law and 
religion perspective); see generally Jeremy A. Rovinsky, The Cutting Edge: The 
Debate over Regulation of Ritual Slaughter in the Western World, 45 CAL. W. INT’L 
L.J. 79 (2014) (discussing the legality of ritual slaughter in Western democracies).  
223.  See generally Kenneth Einar Himma, An Unjust Dogma: Why a Special 
Right to Religion Wrongly Discriminates against Non-Religious Worldviews, 54 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 217 (2017); Arif A. Jamal, Considering Freedom of Religion in a Post-
Secular Context: Hapless or Hopeful? 6 OXFORD J. L. & RELIGION 433 (2017); 
Christopher C. Lund, Religion is Special Enough, 103 VA. L. REV. 481 (2017); Brett 
G. Scharffs, Why Religious Freedom - Why the Religiously Committed, the Religiously 
Indifferent, and Those Hostile to Religion Should Care, 2017 BYU L. REV. 957 
(2017); NELSON TEBBE, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AN EGALITARIAN AGE (2017); Tara 
Smith, Religious Liberty or Religious License: Legal Schizophrenia and the Case 
against Examptions, 32 J.L. & POL. 43 (2016); LABORDE, supra note 39; SMITH, 
supra note 48; LEITER, supra note 56; DWORKIN, supra note 30; ANDREW 
KOPPELMAN, DEFENDING AMERICAN RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY (2013); MICAH 
SCHWARTZMAN, What if Religion is Not Special?, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1351 (2012); 
MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE (2008); Chad Flanders, The 
Possibility of a Secular First Amendment, 26 QLR 257 (2008); CHRISTOPHER L. 
EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION 
(2007); James Nickel, Who Needs Freedom of Religion?, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 941 
(2005); WINNIFRED FALLERS SULLIVAN, THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
(2005).  Cf. Steven P. Aggergaard, The Question Speech on Private Campuses and 
the Answer Nobody Wants to Hear, 44 MITCHELL HAMLINE L. REV. 629 (2018). 
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politics?224  Hence, what do current debates in legal theory and liberal 
political philosophy tell us about the way modern liberal democracies 
interpret, value, protect, and deal with religious freedom?  Is the 
outcome of S.A.S. compatible with the existing line of research within 
the liberal paradigm of law and religious scholarship?  To answer all 
these questions, we need to develop a theoretical framework to help us 
conceptualize the possible liberal responses to the question whether 
religion qua religion deserves special protection.225 
1. Liberal Theories of Religious Freedom 
The main distinction in law and religious scholarship on the role of 
religion for granting exemptions and justifying decisions in law lies 
between liberal and sectarian theories of religious freedom.  As such, 
sectarian theories justify the special legal solicitude toward religion 
with an appeal to some values that are considered distinctly religious.226  
                                                          
224.  Schwartzman, supra note 38, at 15 (arguing the current debate in liberal 
political philosophy regarding the role of religion in law and politics consists of two 
more specific debates: (1) the role of religion for the purpose of state actions (public 
justification debate); and (2) its relevance for granting exemptions (the religious 
accommodation debate) to certain groups in society).  
225.  The main research method of this Part is a conceptual meta-analysis of 
positions defended in the “specialness-debate” of religion, with a particular focus on 
the liberal theories of religious freedom.  To identify the binding characteristic of the 
normative positions, this article has developed a matrix of positions.  This matrix 
focuses on the arguments developed to deal with the question whether religion qua 
religion needs special legal protection.  An advantage of this method is that it helps to 
see what the advantages and disadvantages of a particular concept are.  It is also 
helpful to see what the alternatives are.  See generally Schwartzman, supra note 38, 
at 28 (explaining how building up a theory in a systematic way sharpens our mind to 
see the inconsistencies in the existing body of knowledge); W. COLE DURHAM, JR. & 
BRETT G. SCHARFFS, LAW AND RELIGION: NATIONAL, INTERNATIONAL, AND 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 45 (2010) (on file with author) (providing a taxonomy 
of the various definitions of religion, as used in the case law or defended in the law 
and religion scholarship).  
226.  See generally Lund, supra note 223, at 490 (providing an overview of and 
discussing some of the religious arguments in favor of religious freedom); Cécile 
Laborde, Religion in the Law: The Disaggregation Approach, 34 LAW & PHIL. 581, 
582 (2015) (explaining the distinction between liberal and sectarian theories of 
religious freedom and arguing that the transcendental value of religion does not justify 
religious freedom).  For a sectarian justification of religious freedom qua religious, 
compare RAFAEL DOMINGO, GOD AND THE SECULAR LEGAL SYSTEM 79, 80-82 
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The paradigmatic distinction between sectarian and liberal theories of 
religious freedom is present within the paradigm of religion in liberal 
political philosophy.227  There are also hybrid theories of religious 
freedom, using a mixture of liberal and sectarian arguments to justify 
religious freedom and the legality of certain religious manifestations.228  
This section focuses on the liberal theories of religious freedom that 
have put the question of religious accommodation under critical 
scrutiny, either by challenging or defending the special legal solicitude 
                                                          
(2016) (considering the “protection of suprarationality” as the “ultimate justification” 
for protecting religion qua religion); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Priority of God: A 
Theory of Religious Liberty, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 1159, 1183 (2013); DAVID NOVAK, IN 
DEFENSE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 116, 117 (2009) (using a transcendental argument to 
justify the special legal protection of religion); JOHN H. GARVEY, WHAT ARE 
FREEDOMS FOR? 57 (1996) (on file with author) (claiming that within the context of 
U.S. constitutional law, the “split-level character” could only be clarified in light of 
an exclusive “religious justification” of religious freedom); Michael W. McConnell, 
Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 15 (1985) (arguing the liberal state 
is not able to ultimately exclude the possibility that religious claims might be true, 
which means that the transcendental authority of such claims has more value than the 
claims of the state).  McConnell continued to defend this line in recent publications. 
See Michael W. McConnell, Why Protect Religious Freedom?, 123 YALE L.J. 770, 
786-89 (2013). 
227.  Cf. Paul B. Anderson, Religious Liberty under Communism, 6 J. CHURCH 
& ST. 169 (1964) (showing non-liberal, non-sectarian theories of religious freedom). 
228.  Cf. Donna E. Arzt, Religious Freedom in a Religious State: The Case of 
Israel in Comparative Constitutional Perspective, 9 WIS. INT’L L.J. 1 (1990) 
(comparing the Israeli approach to religious freedom).  The hybrid approach to the 
justification of religious freedom should not be confused with quasi-liberal 
approaches to religious liberty, which favor the majoritarian religion or the religions 
of “recognized” minorities.  Compare with the Constitution of the Islamic Republic 
of Iran that contains a sectarian explanation of “religious freedom.”  Articles 12 and 
13 of Iran’s Constitution exhaustively enumerate religions that are allowed to practice 
their faiths within the legal framework of the Islamic Republic.  The “recognized” 
religions include Zoroastrianism, Judaism and Christianity.  The Shia Jafari school of 
beliefs is the “eternally immutable” state’s religion.  See QANUNI ASSASSI JUMHURII 
ISLAMAI IRAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN] (1980) (Iran), 
http://www.divan-edalat.ir/show.php?page=base, (translation) (last visited Feb. 27, 
2019).  For a quasi-liberal approach to religious freedom, see the recent proposal of 
the Dutch SGP. This party has argued that the state should make a distinction between 
religions that have shaped the Dutch tradition (including Christianity and Judaism but 
excluding Islam), to protect the Judeo-Christian character of the Dutch culture and 
society.  See SGP, supra note 30, at 3-4. 
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for religion.229  Essential to the religious accommodation debate is for 
whom accommodations should be made for and for what kind of 
reasons?230  These questions are used by legal theorists and liberal 
political philosophers to determine the normative tolerance and 
protection of religious beliefs and practices in liberal democracies. 
In order to identify how the liberal paradigm of the law and 
religious scholarship has evolved, we need to categorize the type of 
arguments used within this paradigm.  Categorizing this paradigm looks 
beyond the empirical argument that suggests religion is special because 
of religious freedom, accommodation through case law, and people’s 
relationship with religion as a special experience that deserves special 
protection in law.  Rather, this categorization draws on the body of 
normative arguments that posit how the law in liberal democracies 
should deal with the category of religion.231  Generally, liberal theories 
of religious freedom contain “strong rejectionist” and “soft rejectionist” 
responses to the question of whether religion should be treated special 
in law.  The strong rejectionist responses claim that there is nothing 
special about religion that makes it a protection worthy category in law.  
Therefore, religion does not deserve any special protection qua 
                                                          
229.  See generally LABORDE & BARDON, supra note 39. 
230.  These two questions are helpful to deal in a more systematic way with the 
controversies that arise out of free exercise.  Cf. LEITER, supra note 56, at 3 (Brian 
Leiter compares an orthodox Sikh boy to a non-Sikh boy from a traditional family.  
Both boys want to wear a dagger—the orthodox Sikh boy for religious purposes (he 
wants to wear a kirpan, a religious object made of metal that resembles a dagger) and 
the other for reasons of tradition.  This case questions what the justification would be 
to treat the two differently.  That is to say, Leiter asks, “[w]hy the state should have 
to tolerate exemptions from generally applicable laws when they conflict with 
religious obligations but not with any other equally serious obligations of 
conscience.”). 
231.  Basically, the conceptual question of these liberal theories of religious 
freedom is: should the law grant religion qua religion special protection, or rather, 
should the law treat religion special because of the protection-worthy liberal 
substitutes of religion.  For the development of this particular argument, I have 
benefited tremendously from the feedback of professor Benjamin Berger on the theory 
of abstraction during my stay as visiting researcher at Osgoode Hall Law School in 
Toronto (Apr. 2017).  For a similar method that aims to challenge the empirical 
argument, see generally LEITER, supra note 56; DWORKIN, supra note 30; 
Schwartzman, supra note 223; Perry, supra note 64; Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 
20 (questioning why the law protects religion specially). 
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religion.232  The softer responses cover the body of arguments positing 
that the category of religion is not special as such but the liberal 
substitutes of religion are special.  Therefore, religion is only special by 
virtue of abstraction from the religious dimension. 
2. A Taxonomy of the Liberal Theories of Religious Freedom 
This section develops a conceptual framework of normative 
approaches to religion in law.  This framework classifies the liberal 
positions into five categories.  First, principled rejection of arguments 
that justify the special legal protection of religion with an appeal to 
values that are presented as distinctly religious.  Rejectionist arguments 
reject qualifying specific beliefs or manifestations as religious.  Second, 
substitution consists of arguments explaining why religion is a subset 
of a broader human faculty, namely conscience.  Substitution also 
covers arguments that say religious freedom has no distinct 
constitutional value, like other liberties, such as the freedom of 
expression and association.  These in combination with the right to non-
discrimination, in practice could guarantee free exercise of religion.  
Third, generalization opposes a sectarian interpretation of religion and 
religious freedom, arguing that religion stands for deep ethical 
commitments of human beings and that religious freedom is the general 
right that gives human beings access to ethical independence and moral 
freedom.  Fourth, equation, which says that equality of treatment should 
be the norm when authorities are dealing with deep commitments of 
human beings who ask for exemptions from the application of general 
laws.  Fifth, representation, which justifies the special legal protection 
of religion in light of values that are not necessarily religious in nature.  
Religion represents in this position certain values that let human beings 
flourish—this particular argument justifies the special legal protection 
of religion.233 
                                                          
232.  Basically, the position of Brian Leiter and Kenneth Einar Himma.  See 
generally LEITER, supra note 56; Himma, supra note 223. 
233.  The focus is on the appropriate interpretation of “the notion of religion in 
law (regardless of whether the category of freedom of religion is upheld or not).” 
Laborde, supra note 226, at 594.  
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a.  Rejection 
The rejectionist position discards arguments that justify religious 
freedom with an appeal to values that are considered distinctly 
religious. This position consists of two broader categories: principled 
rejection and non-principled rejection. Non-principled rejection claims 
that the concept of religion does not apply to certain beliefs, traditions 
or manifestations.234 Yet, non-principled rejection does not exclude the 
option to use the term “religion” to consider other manifestations as 
religious for reasons of consensus and tradition.  Thus, it promotes the 
term “religion” for particular religions and excludes other religions as 
not falling under the specific definition of “religion.”  The appropriate 
example is the rhetorical approach currently present in the political 
discourse, which views Islam not as a religion but as a totalitarian 
ideology with a closed internal system of rules that prescribe in detail 
how one should live his or her life.  Against this backdrop, it has been 
argued practices and beliefs that are based on Islam should not have 
access to the privileges of religious freedom.235  Principled rejection 
draws primarily on the idea that there are no principled reasons to 
tolerate religion qua religion within liberal democracies.236 
i.  Principled Rejection 
The principled rejectionist rejects tolerating religion qua religion 
for principled reasons (i.e., reasons that find their origins in morality or 
epistemology).  This position starts from the question of what toleration 
on principled grounds says about the justification of the special legal 
protection of religion qua religion.  Thus, it questions whether the 
concept of toleration provides any room for arguments that justify 
religious toleration because of any specialness of religion (i.e., 
distinctly religious values).  This sub-position defines pure toleration as 
                                                          
234.  See generally AMOS N. GUIORA, FREEDOM FROM RELIGION 19 (2009). 
235.  See generally Wahedi, supra note 45. 
236.  LEITER, supra note 56, at 7, 55, 67; see also Schwartzman, supra note 38, 
at 22; Cécile Laborde, Conclusion: Is Religion Special?, in RELIGION, SECULARISM, 
AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 423 (Jean Louise Cohen & Cécile Laborde eds., 
2016); DWORKIN, supra note 30, at 111, 144; NUSSBAUM, supra note 223, at 164; 
Nickel, supra note 223, at 943; Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 20, at 1248; see 
generally SULLIVAN, supra note 223; Himma, supra note 223. 
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the situation in which the dominant group sees on moral, or epistemic 
grounds a reason to allow, or tolerate on such principled grounds, 
another group of citizens to continue with acts or manifestations that 
are considered objectionable by the dominant group.  Principled 
rejection draws on this particular definition of toleration and concludes 
that the principle of toleration does not require special legal protection 
for religion qua religion.237 
The principled rejectionist questions whether one can identify one 
or more principled reasons that could justify a toleration regime for 
religion qua religion.  To answer this question, a distinction is made 
between two potentially distinctive characteristics of religion: “the 
categoricity of religious commands” and “insulation [of religious 
beliefs] from evidence” and reason.238  This particular feature is closely 
related to the argument that religious beliefs might be distinctive due to 
their involvement in a “metaphysics of ultimate reality.”239  According 
to this position, the moral reasons for toleration only justify the special 
legal protection of human conscience.  This moral justification of 
liberty of conscience does not simultaneously single out religion and its 
categoricity of commands for special legal protection.  Thus, no 
evidence could support the argument that people in the Rawlsian 
“original position” will opt for religious freedom next to equal liberty 
of conscience.240  Hence, the emphasis on the need for liberty of 
conscience does not make a distinction between the backgrounds of 
conscientious commands—it does not single out religion for a special 
favored treatment.241  Leiter explains this argument as follows: 
                                                          
237.  Toleration is usually justified on different types of moral and epistemic 
grounds.  Brian Leiter concludes there is nothing special, in terms of morality or 
epistemology, to warrant toleration of religion qua religion.  LEITER, supra note 56, 
at 7-13; see LORENZO ZUCCA, A SECULAR EUROPE. LAW AND RELIGION IN THE 
EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL LANDSCAPE 8, n.17 (2012) (providing a broader 
definition of toleration).  
238.  LEITER, supra note 56, at 33-34.  
239.  Id. at 47.  See also NUSSBAUM, supra note 223, at 168.  
240.  Rawlsian morality argues in favor of toleration stating that people in the 
original position, when they perform behind the “veil of ignorance,” will definitely 
accept some categorical demands, though these are not of a religious nature per se.  In 
other words, this ground of toleration does not provide a principled argument to 
tolerate “religion qua religion.”  See generally LEITER, supra note 56, at 55.  
241.  See Simon Căbulea May, Exemptions for Conscience, in RELIGION IN 
LIBERAL POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 191 (Cécile Laborde & Aurélia Bardon eds., 2017) 
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Rawls repeatedly lumps religious and moral categoricity together, so 
that it is fair to say that the only thing individuals behind the veil of 
ignorance know is that they will accept some categorical demands, 
not they will accept distinctively religious ones, that is, ones whose 
grounding is a matter of faith.242 
Similarly, the utilitarian moral arguments for toleration (which 
focus on the maximization of human well-being that, among others, 
depends on the ability of people to live by their conscience) do not 
prescribe special protection of religion.  Therefore, toleration on moral 
grounds does not support the arguments that aim to single out religion 
as a matter of principled toleration.243 
The other principled ground for toleration found in the epistemic 
arguments draws on an accepted toleration for knowledge expansion.  
Interestingly, knowledge expansion conflicts with religion’s second 
potentially distinctive feature: insulation of religious beliefs from 
evidence and reason.244  As Leiter argues, it is far from obvious “to 
think, after all, that tolerating the expression of beliefs that are insulated 
from evidence and reasons—that is, insulated from epistemically 
relevant considerations—will promote knowledge of the truth.”245  
Although this argument does not address religious manifestations’ 
effect on knowledge expansion, it is conceivable to say that principled 
rejection equally rejects arguments that aim to justify toleration of 
religious conduct, solely because of religion.  Arguably, there is no 
reason to deny that both religious practices and beliefs are equally 
insulated from evidence. 
                                                          
(arguing that accommodation of sincere conscientious objections to generally 
applicable laws face the same criticism of unfair treatment as religious 
accommodation does). 
242.  LEITER, supra note 56, at 55; see Andrew Koppelman, A Rawlsian Defence 
of Special Treatment for Religion, in RELIGION IN LIBERAL POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 
31 (Cécile Laborde & Aurélia Bardon eds., 2017) (presenting some Rawlsian 
arguments in defense of religious freedom). 
243.  LEITER, supra note 56, at 55, 61. 
244.  Leiter argues reliance on Mill’s perspective on what is “true for the right 
reasons” will not make a strong case to tolerate religion qua religion for epistemic 
reasons; religious faith excludes the idea that there might be some uncovered truth.  
Id. at 58. 
245.  Id. at 55-56. 
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ii.  Non-Principled Rejection 
Non-principled rejection rejects the qualification of certain beliefs, 
speeches, or conducts as religious, and is mainly present in political and 
legal discourse.  As such, one can refer to the political approach of the 
Dutch right-wing party, Partij voor de Vrijheid (the Party for Freedom), 
toward Islam.  This political party has repeatedly argued that Islam is 
not a religion, but rather a totalitarian ideology that should not enjoy 
the privileges of religious freedom.  Consequently, it has proposed an 
immigration ban from Islamic countries, legal prohibition of the Koran, 
and closure of all mosques and Islamic schools in the Netherlands.246  
Non-principled rejection in legal discourse occurs when one asks for 
permission to perform a practice that is portrayed as religious but 
apparently prohibited by authorities.  In some of the cases dealing with 
the legal admissibility of norm-deviant practices, the court or other 
parties involved refuse to admit that the practice at stake has a 
potentially religious dimension.247 
Similarly, in the legal debate related to the Travel Ban of President 
Trump, some scholars have explicitly argued that this ban has nothing 
to do with religion, purporting that it is related to security concerns.248  
Most notably, one of the legal advisors to President Trump revealed the 
President-elect asked him about how he could realize his promised 
                                                          
246.  Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal [The House of Representatives], 
Aanhangsel Handelingen II [Parliamentary Proceedings II], 2016/2017, at 2-6-61 
and 2-6-62 (Neth.) (on file with author). 
247.  Compare with tax exemption litigations of the Scientology Church and the 
Church of Satan case: Hof. Den Haag 21 October 2015, 
ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2015:2875, ¶ 8.16 (Neth.) (holding that the activities of the 
Scientology Church—in particular, Auditing and Training—are commercial in nature 
and not religious, serving primarily private interests.  Thus, the Church is ineligible 
for tax exemptions).  The case of Saint-Walburga, which focused on sisters forming 
the Church of Satan, turned on the question whether a brothel could be considered a 
religious institution.  HR 31 October 1986, ECLI:NL:HR:1986:AC9553 (Neth.); Cf. 
Religion Based on Sex Gets a Judicial Review, N.Y. TIMES, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1990/05/02/us/religion-based-on-sex-gets-a-judicial-
review.html  (discussing a case in which a couple charged for pimping and prostitution 
claimed that the activities that took place in the Church were part of their sacred 
religion). 
248.  See generally Michael B. Mukasey, Judicial Independence: The Fortress 
Threatened from Within, 47 U. MEM. L. REV. 1223 (2017) (defending the ban as a 
matter of national security) (on file with author). 
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Muslim travel ban in a legal way.249  The advisory team found “danger” 
was an appropriate substitute for those coming from Muslim majority 
countries—the category of people, the President promised he would 
single out for special travel restrictions.250  The shift from focusing on 
security matters and rejecting the religious dimension in this context 
was “perfectly sensible, perfectly legal.”251 
b.  Substitution 
The substitution position claims both religion and religious 
freedom have adequate substitutes.252  Like the rejectionist position, 
substitution consists of both principled substitution and non-principled 
substitution.253  Principled substitution draws on arguments that view 
religion as a subset of a particular faculty that is worthy of special legal 
protection.  This protection-worthy faculty concerns human 
conscience.254  The argument is that free exercise of religion and the 
admissibility of religious claims for exemptions could be adequately 
ensured through freedom of conscience.255  Non-principled substitution 
                                                          
249.  Jim Dwyer, First Came Giuliani’s Input on the Immigration Order. Now 
There’s the Court Test, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/09/nyregion/rudolph-giuliani-donald-trump-
travel-ban.html. 
250.  See id. 
251.  Id. 
252.  See generally LABORDE, supra note 39; Michah Schwartzman, Religion 
as a Legal Proxy, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1085, 1099 (2014) (discussing the 
“substitution” position). 
253.  See generally NUSSBAUM, supra note 223 (providing a deeper 
philosophical account for the argument that religion has a substitute, like conscience); 
Nickel, supra note 223 (purporting that religious freedom can be replaced by other 
freedoms). 
254.  This article will not engage in the discussion about the different 
conceptions of conscience.  Neither will it discuss the argument that there is a 
difference between human conscience and religious conscience.  See Lund, supra note 
223, at 503-04.  For the argument that this article aims to develop, it is sufficient to 
indicate that some liberal theorists of religious freedom argue that religion and 
religious freedom have certain substitutes. 
255.  See JOCELYN MACLURE & CHARLES TAYLOR, SECULARISM AND FREEDOM 
OF CONSCIENCE 89 (2011) (arguing that given “the context of contemporary societies 
marked by moral and religious diversity, it is not religious convictions in themselves 
that must enjoy a special status but rather, all core beliefs that allow individuals to 
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views basic liberties as being in practice enough to guarantee the free 
exercise of religion.  Thus, as Nickel has rightly asked: “who needs 
freedom of religion,” when this right turns out to be superfluous?256 
i. Principled Substitution 
Principled substitution says that religion is a subset of a broader 
protection-worthy category: the conscience.257  With reference to the 
work of Roger Williams, Nussbaum argues: 
The faculty with which each person searches for the ultimate 
meaning of life is of intrinsic worth and value, and is worthy of 
respect whether the person is using it well or badly.  The faculty is 
identified in part by what it does—it reasons, searches, and 
experiences emotions of longing connected to that search—and in 
part by its subject matter—it deals with ultimate questions, questions 
of ultimate meaning.  It is the faculty, not its goal, that is the basis of 
political respect, and thus we can agree to respect the faculty without 
prejudicing the question whether there is a meaning to be found, or 
what it might be like.  From the respect we have for the person’s 
conscience, that faculty of inquiring and searching, it follows that we 
ought to respect the space required by any activity that has the 
general shape of searching for the ultimate meaning of life, except 
when that search violates the right of others or comes up against 
some compelling state interest.258 
According to Nussbaum, this way of reasoning helps us “make 
sense of our feeling that there really is something about religion or 
quasi-religion that calls for special protection and delicacy.”259  
                                                          
structure their moral identity.”).  See also LABORDE, supra note 39, at 66-67 (critical 
of the position defended by Jocelyn Maclure and Charles Taylor). 
256.  Nickel, supra note 223, at 943. 
257.  See also Koppelman, supra note 242, at 38 (rejecting the claim that 
religion is a subset of human conscience and arguing that the latter is at best a 
complement, not a substitute, for teleologically loaded terms such as religion).  
258.  NUSSBAUM, supra note 223, at 168-69.  
259.  Id. at 169 (arguing the search for meaningful answers to ultimate questions 
of life helps us to keep our special solicitude for religion, as a matter of respect for a 
broader human faculty, separated from “silly” faculties.  That is to say, “faculties used 
by my car lover, who isn’t engaged in a search for meaning, or the person who feels 
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Specifically, this protection-worthy “something” is the human 
conscience, which is an inalienable dignity people possess, regardless 
of educational or socioeconomic background, health, religious belief, 
and more.260  Thus, there is no principled reason to single out religion 
because it is religion.  Rather, there is a principled argument to justify 
the special protection of a broad liberty of conscience that encompasses 
and protects the religious conscience as a matter of respect for human 
dignity.261  Accordingly, religious claims for exemptions are sometimes 
granted “because they involve matters of conscience, not matters of 
religion.”262 
ii.  Non-Principled Substitution 
Non-principled substitution seeks to invalidate the necessity of a 
separate right to religious freedom.263  Specifically, existing freedoms 
of speech and association, and bans on discrimination and violence, 
render a separate right unnecessary.264  In other words: freedom of 
religion has at least some very “adequate substitute[s].”265  Arguments 
that support the replacement of religious freedom consider this right 
“dispensable,”266 as other basic liberties ensure the free exercise of 
religion.  The argument suggests religious manifestations are related to 
a broad range of areas, such as business, politics and association.  Non-
                                                          
called to dress like a chicken when going to work, which is (probably) just too silly to 
count as a genuine search for meaning.”).  
260.  Id.  
261.  Id. at 164-74; see also NUSSBAUM, supra note 169, at 61-66; see generally 
LEITER, supra note 56 (discussing the line that liberty of conscience is an appropriate 
substitute for religious freedom).  In the theoretical framework that Leiter uses to 
develop his argument, principled substitution arises out of what the liberal concept of 
toleration considers protection-worthy for principled reasons: equal liberty of 
conscience.  
262.  LEITER, supra note 56, at 64.  
263.  See generally Nickel, supra note 223. 
264.  See generally Nickel, supra note 223, for a further discussion of this 
position; see also Mark Tushnet, Redundant of Free Exercise Clause?, 33 LOY. U. 
CHI. L. J. 71, 73, 94 (2001).  See generally Scott M. Noveck, The Promise and 
Problems of Treating Religious Freedom as Freedom of Association, 45 GONZ. L. 
REV. 745 (2009). 
265.  Tushnet, supra note 264, at 94.  
266.  Nickel, supra note 223, at 941.  
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principled substitution understands religious freedom in light of the 
argument “that the sorts of activities it involves are covered by the most 
important general liberties.”267 
Furthermore, non-principled substitution expects religious freedom 
shares the same basis as other basic liberties.  Thus, there is no reason 
to think religion is something unique that could justify the special legal 
solicitude toward religion qua religion.  The expectation is that 
understanding the need for the free exercise of religion in light of 
existing basic liberties may eliminate the idea that religious beliefs are 
privileged in society.  Therefore, the granted exemptions are the 
outcome of a proper application of basic liberties and not derived from 
the presumed distinct value of religious beliefs.  Lastly, the emphasis 
on the protection of religious beliefs through the application of basic 
liberties ensures people have a real choice to engage in or disapprove 
certain convictions.268 
c.  Generalization 
Generalization advocates a broader, ecumenical and non-sectarian 
definition of religion and religious freedom.  Against this normative 
backdrop, generalization defends the position that religious freedom 
should not be considered a special right, which protects only a selected 
group of people—the believers.269  Rather, religious freedom should be 
a general right to ethical and moral independence.270  This position is 
ecumenical because it looks beyond the sectarian theistic accounts of 
religion.  It is also non-sectarian because it does not bifurcate theistic 
and non-theistic convictions about the good.271  Generalization looks 
beyond the narrow, theistic conception of “religion” and argues that 
both God-believers and non-believers may be considered “religious,” 
as both could have the same convictions about fundamental 
questions.272  In examining the deep commitment that religious and 
                                                          
267.  Id. at 950. 
268.  Id. at 943-50. 
269.  DWORKIN, supra note 30, at 132 (discussing religious freedom as a general 
right to ethical independence); see also Perry, supra note 64, at 996 (stating how 
broadening religious freedom will encompass moral freedom). 
270.  Id. 
271.  Id. 
272.  DWORKIN, supra note 30, at 5. 
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non-religious people share, the generalist position sees an “intrinsic and 
inescapable ethical responsibility” to succeed in life.273  Accordingly, 
this position says religious freedom should be the general right to 
ethical independence that opens the doors to moral freedom.274 
Under the generalist framework, religious freedom is the right that 
gives humans full access to ethical independence.275  Thus, the 
generalist account of religious freedom emphasizes the opportunities 
for individuals to make independent life decisions based on their deeply 
held ethical commitments.  This approach apparently extends the 
definition of religion.276  The main justification for this extension is 
rooted in the idea that we need a deeper, non-sectarian understanding 
of religious freedom because the free exercise of religion cannot be 
protected on sectarian grounds for distinctly religious reasons.277  The 
leading normative argument behind generalization’s core tenets—
religious beliefs as deep ethical commitments and religious freedom as 
a general right to moral and ethical independence—is the assumption 
that public authorities are not apt to judge what should count as moral 
or religious truth.278 
                                                          
273.  Id. at 114.  See also James McBride, Paul Tillich and the Supreme Court: 
Tillich’s Ultimate Concern as a Standard in Judicial Interpretation, 30 J. CHURCH & 
ST. 245, 260 (1988) (discussing Paul Tillich’s idea of “ultimate concerns” that 
scholars have used to interpret religion beyond its theistic definition).  Many thanks 
to Christy Green for the suggestion to have a look at Paul Tillich’s discussion of 
“ultimate concerns.” 
274.  DWORKIN, supra note 30, at 129-30. 
275.  Id. at 132. 
276.  See Schwartzman, supra note 38, at 22.  A serious concern of this 
“symmetrical theory” of religious freedom—on both sides (public justification and 
religious accommodation) religion is not something special—is the huge risk of 
anarchy.  See generally DWORKIN, supra note 30, at 117; LEITER, supra note 56, at 
95; NUSSBAUM, supra note 223, at 173 (drawing attention to the side-constraints of 
an all-inclusive term religion). 
277.  DWORKIN, supra note 30, at 17, 129.  See generally Matthew Clayton, Is 
Ethical Independence Enough?, in RELIGION IN LIBERAL POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 132 
(Cécile Laborde & Aurélia Bardon Eds.) (2017) (a recent defense of Dworkin’s 
approach to religious freedom). 
278.  Perry, supra note 64, at 1012.  This concerns a Lockean criticism on 
governmental interference in matters of morality and religion.  Locke states that the 
main purpose of the law “is not to provide for the truth of opinions, but for the safety 
and security of the commonwealth and of every particular man’s goods and person.”  
Id. at 1003. 
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Understanding religion in terms of access to ethical independence 
pursues an ideal of liberal neutrality,279 toward what Nussbaum has 
called, the “ultimate questions” of life.280  The call for liberal neutrality 
toward deep human commitments is bolstered by the crux of ethical 
independence, which “requires that government not restrict citizens’ 
freedom when its justification assumes that one concept of how to live, 
or what makes a successful life, is superior to others.  It is often an 
interpretive question, and sometimes a difficult one, whether a policy 
does reflect that assumption.”281  To clarify why we should endorse 
liberal neutrality as a matter of principle, the generalist position divides 
basic liberties into special and general rights. The difference between 
these two variants is rooted in what the threshold authorities must cross 
when they aim to restrict a right.  Special rights focus on a particular 
“subject matter” and it is complicated to limit these rights legitimately, 
except in cases of emergency.  General rights, on the other hand, focus 
on the relation between authorities and people.  General rights restrict 
the scope of arguments authorities can provide to legitimately limit the 
exercise of a general right.282 
The specific distinction between general (restrict arguments to limit 
free exercise) and special (focus is on a protection-worthy subject) 
rights gives generalists a reason to argue that religious freedom should 
be a general right, as the category of “religion” remains a complicated 
subject to interpret.  Thus, the definition problem of religion, which the 
generalists posit is intertwined with freedom of religion, is an important 
argument to oppose granting religious freedom a special status.  That is 
to say, considering religious freedom a special right.  The semantic 
criticism at this point conveys that a special right would explicitly focus 
                                                          
279.  Cécile Laborde, Dworkin’s Freedom of Religion Without God, 94 B.U. L. 
REV. 125, 125 (2014). 
280.  NUSSBAUM, supra note 223, at 168. 
281.  DWORKIN, supra note 30, at 141-42. 
282.  DWORKIN, supra note 30, at 132-33 (stating that “a special right of religion 
declares that government must not constrain religious exercise in any way, absent an 
extraordinary emergency.  The general right to ethical independence, on the 
contrary . . . limits the reasons government may offer for any constraint on a citizen’s 
freedom at all.”). 
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on the definition of religion and it would not be able to solve the 
definition problem of this right.283 
Furthermore, a special right requires high demands on restrictions 
that aim to limit the exercise of such a right.  Instead, the generalist 
position argues that approaching religious freedom as a general right to 
ethical independence will provide protection to the free exercise of 
religion.  The generalist position explains that the right to ethical 
independence “condemns any explicit discrimination . . . that 
assumes . . . that one variety of religious faith is superior to others in 
truth or virtue or that a political majority is entitled to favor one faith 
over others or that atheism is father to immorality.”284  Moreover, it 
“protects religious conviction in a more subtle way as well: by 
outlawing any constraint neutral on its face but whose design covertly 
assumes some direct or indirect subordination.”285  However, 
understanding religious freedom as a general right to ethical 
independence might force people to adjust their religious conduct in a 
way that conforms to laws that are not per se catered to them.286  
Therefore, the generalist position argues that authorities should take 
into account whether restrictions on a particular practice they propose 
are in fact targeting what one group might consider “a sacred duty.”287  
If so, “then the legislature must consider whether equal concern . . . 
requires an exemption or other amelioration.  If an exception can be 
managed with no significant damage to the policy in play, then it might 
be unreasonable not to grant that exception.”288 
                                                          
283.  Id.; see generally LABORDE, supra note 39, at 30-33; SULLIVAN, supra 
note 223, at 1-4 (discussing the problem of defining religion). 
284.  DWORKIN, supra note 30, at 133-34. 
285.  Id. at 134. 
286.  Ronald Dworkin stated, “[i]f we deny a special right to free exercise of 
religious practice, and rely only on the general right to ethical independence, then 
religions may be forced to restrict their practices so as to obey rational, non-
discriminatory laws that do not display less than equal concern for them.”  Id. at 135-
36. 
287.  Id. at 136. 
288.  Id. 
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d.  Equation 
Equation requires equal respect for all deep concerns of people.  In 
effect, religious beliefs and practices of one group of citizens, as they 
relate to deep human concerns, should not be favored over similar deep 
concerns of others.  Religious freedom should ensure this equal 
treatment of people.289  Against this backdrop, equation opposes 
arguments that justify religious freedom in light of any “distinct value” 
of religious manifestations.  Rather, it argues that believers’ 
vulnerability to discrimination should be considered the main 
justification for religious freedom.  In addition, equation opposes a 
“religious” understanding of religious freedom.  In this sense, equation 
is very close to generalization.  However, there are two main 
differences.  First, it is not indifference or neutrality as such that 
requires principled equation.290  Rather, it is the ideal of equality of 
treatment of all acts and thoughts that have an intrinsic value.291  
Second, equation does not generalize religious freedom to something 
like the general right to ethical independence and moral freedom.292  
Instead, equation approaches religious freedom from the principle of 
equality of treatment, which is considered the main constitutional value 
of a liberal democracy.293  Therefore, the equation approach is part of 
                                                          
289.  Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Does It Matter What 
Religion Is? 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 807, 834-35 (2009) (stating that “the point of 
the Religion Clauses is not to affirm (or deny) the value of religious practices, any 
more than the point of the Free Speech Clause is to affirm (or deny) the value of flag 
burning.”). 
290.  See Bret Boyce, Equality and the Free Exercise of Religion, 57 CLEV. ST. 
L. REV. 493, 496-97, 520 (2009). 
291.  See Christopher C. Lund, Exploring Free Exercise Doctrine: Equal 
Liberty and Religious Exemptions, 77 TENN. L. REV. 351, at 352 (2010) (arguing that 
some liberal theorists of religious freedom have “[attacked] religious exemptions on 
the general premise that they are fundamentally unfair to nonreligious people.”). 
292.  See EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 223, 51-77 (2007); see generally 
LABORDE, supra note 39, at 55-57; Lund, supra note 291, at 360 (critical of the theory 
developed by Eisgruber and Sager).  See also Boyce, supra note 290, at 496-97 
(differentiating between equality in treatment and equality in effect). 
293.  See LABORDE, supra note 39, at 19.  
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what has been called the egalitarian theories of religious freedom.294  
The question is, however, equation of what?295  At the outset, this 
position is anti-favoritism,296 as it advocates equal treatment of all 
conscientious manifestations and beliefs that contain an intrinsic 
value.297 
Equation “requires simply that government treat[s] the deep, 
religiously inspired concerns of minority religious believers with the 
same regard as that enjoyed by the deep concerns of citizens 
generally.”298  Thus, there are no principled reasons to differentiate 
between deep human commitments.  The norm should be an equal 
approach to non-religious and religious perspectives on the ultimate 
questions of life.  The equation approach rethinks religious freedom as 
“the right of the individual . . . to life outside the state—the right to live 
as a self on which many given, as well as chosen, demands are made.  
Such a right may not be best realized through laws guaranteeing 
religious freedom but by laws guaranteeing equality.”299  Thus, the 
regime of religious toleration should be understood against the 
backdrop of human vulnerability to discrimination.  Eisgruber and 
Sager states: 
[what] properly motivates constitutional solicitude for religious 
practices is their distinct vulnerability to discrimination, not their 
distinct value; and what is called for, in turn, is protection against 
discrimination, not privilege against legitimate governmental 
concerns.  When we have replaced value with vulnerability, and the 
paradigm of privilege with that of protection, then it will be possible 
both to make sense of our constitutional past in this area and to chart 
an appealing constitutional future.300 
                                                          
294.  See Cécile Laborde, Liberal Neutrality, Religion and the Good?, in 
RELIGION, SECULARISM, AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 249 (Jean Louise Cohen 
& Cécile Laborde Eds., 2016) (discussing egalitarian theories of religious freedom). 
295.  See LABORDE, supra note 39, at 89. 
296.  SULLIVAN, supra note 223, at 149; see also LABORDE, supra note 39, at 
42. 
297.  EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 223, at 51-77; LABORDE, supra note 39, 
at 51. 
298.  Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 20, at 1283. 
299.  SULLIVAN, supra note 223, at 159. 
300.  Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 20, at 1248. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3385444 
Wahedi camera ready (Do Not Delete) 5/8/2019  12:02 PM 
2019]  FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND LIVING TOGETHER 279 
This position allows us to accept two main differences between 
generalization and equation.  In short, generalization focuses on how 
we should understand religious freedom as a liberty and equation 
approaches religious freedom from the ideal of equality. 
e. Representation 
Representation’s main claim is that a single group should not have 
exclusive protections that are not afforded to other groups.  Hence, it is 
not a sectarian theory of religious freedom.  Representation is rooted, 
as Laborde says, “in the ecumenical value of ethical integrity, and in 
the normative justifications for generic liberal rights such as speech and 
association.”301  Representation views religion as a concept that stands 
for a set of protection-worthy values that are not necessarily “religious” 
at the core.302  These values justify the codification of a special right to 
religious freedom.303 As such, religion, like respect, stands for a 
“hypergood”—a particular category of higher goods.304  Koppelman 
argues that: 
[religion] . . . has a value that can override many other goods and 
preferences.  But religion is one among many hypergoods.  It should 
not be privileged over the rest of them.  This fundamental problem 
of modernity should not be adjudicated by the state.  The problem of 
determining the appropriate hypergood, if any, and its reconciliation 
with the broad range of ordinary goods, is a question that occupies 
the same existential territory as religion.  If the state is incompetent 
                                                          
301.  The position this article qualifies as “representation” elaborates on the 
“proxy” and “disaggregation” approaches.  See LABORDE & BARDON, supra note 39, 
at 599-600. 
302.  See generally Ronan McCrea, The Consequences of Disaggregation and 
the Impossibility of a Third Way, in RELIGION IN LIBERAL POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 69 
(Cécile Laborde & Aurélia Bardon eds., 2017) (criticizing Laborde’s disaggregation 
approach).  
303.  Jane Rutherford, Religion, Rationality, and Special Treatment, 9 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 303, 332 (2001).  
304.  Andrew Koppelman, Is it Fair to Give Religion Special Treatment?, 2006 
U. ILL. L. REV. 571, 594 (2006). 
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to resolve religious questions, it is likewise incompetent to resolve 
this one.305 
To identify the relevant legal values of religion, the representation 
position reflects on the potential matches between the “different parts 
of the law” and “different dimensions of religion for the protection of 
different normative values.”306  Examples of such matches are: the 
presentation of religion as a conception of the good life; a conscientious 
moral obligation; the key feature of identity; mode of human 
association; a vulnerability class; a totalizing institution; and an 
inaccessible doctrine.307  Specifically, matches such as the presentation 
of religion as a conception of the good life, a matter of conscience, 
identity and association, are more “relevant to the notion of freedom of 
religion” than other overlapping areas.308  Hence, representation could 
be defined as “religion-blind without being religion-insensitive, 
because it sees religion, not as a specialised and self-contained area of 
human belief and activity, but as a richly diverse expression of life 
itself.”309 
B. Religious Freedom: Abstraction from the Religious Dimension 
Does religion qua religion deserve special legal protection?  At the 
outset, there is no right or wrong answer to this question.  At most, 
classifying different positions is instructive for mapping the main 
arguments to explore alternative methods.  Also, classifying normative 
approaches is helpful when examining the theoretical differences of the 
                                                          
305.  Id.  In his later publications, Andrew Koppelman has elaborated on 
considering religion a legal proxy.  See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, How Shall I Praise 
Thee? Brian Leiter on Respect for Religion, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 961, 981 (2010) 
(stating “it is not possible to offer a unitary account of what religion is good for.  Like 
a knife or a rock, it is something that people find already existing in the world, which 
they then put to a huge variety of uses.  Religion denotes a cluster of goods.”).  This 
position has been defended more recently in KOPPELMAN, supra note 223, at 124.  See 
also Koppelman, supra note 242, at 36-37 (repeating the view that religion 
encompasses many goods that people aim to purse and religious freedom enables them 
to do that). 
306.  Laborde, supra note 226, at 594. 
307.  Id. at 594-95.  
308.  Id. at 595-97.  
309.  Id. at 600.  
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liberal theories of religious freedom.  Moreover, mapping out 
differences streamlines the process of finding an element of 
commonality between the theories.  The similarities between the 
responses reveal two potential categories.  First, a “strong rejectionist 
response.”  Second, a “soft rejectionist response.”  The strong 
rejectionist response posits that religion should not be considered a 
special protection-worthy category in law.  This position corresponds 
with the rejectionist position.  The softer response also rejects the 
position that religion is special qua religion in law—entailing that the 
liberal substitutes of religion make this category possibly protection 
worthy.  Therefore, religion is only special through substitution, 
generalization, equation, and representation.  Does this twofold 
response about religion’s specialness provide us with a binding 
commonality between all liberal theories of religious freedom?  It does. 
The underlying message supporting both categories of responses is 
that distinctly religious values are not enough to justify the special legal 
solicitude toward religion.  Thus, both responses reject the specialness 
of the metaphysics of religion for the special legal solitude toward 
religion.  The synthesis of the twofold response is the dismissal of the 
special legal protection of religion qua religion.  Moreover, this 
synthesis renounces arguments that justify religious freedom with an 
appeal to any distinct value of religion.  What clarifies and justifies the 
special legal attention for religion is a broader and apparently religion-
empty (i.e., free from distinctly religious values) framework of 
faculties, liberties, and vulnerabilities.310 
The question is, what does this predominantly negative answer to 
the question of whether religion qua religion requires special legal 
protection suggest about the binding feature of the liberal theories of 
religious freedom?  Can we claim that the twofold response that we 
have given is an illustration of “decoupling religion from a god?”311  
Alternatively, does the synthesis of our twofold response fit the 
                                                          
310.  LABORDE, supra note 39, at 42 (criticizing the “vague” broader framework 
that is adopted by egalitarian theorists of religious freedom to justify the special legal 
solicitude toward religion).  
311.  DWORKIN, supra note 30 at 132 (stating that “the problems we 
encountered in defining freedom of religion flow from trying to retain that right as a 
special right while also decoupling religion from a god.”). 
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“tendency, among legal practitioners, to re-describe” religious matters 
in non-religious terms?312 
The synthesis of our negative response encompasses both 
hypothetical questions when it reacts to the justification grounds of the 
special legal solicitude toward religion.  It decouples religion from any 
God.  Essentially, it presents religion as one subcategory in the more 
general and apparently non-religious categories of human conscience 
and the conceptions of the good life.  It decouples religion from any 
God in a further sense.  The twofold response conceptualizes religion 
in a God-empty way, free from distinctly religious values.  For example, 
the definition of religion states that it is the combination of categorical 
demands that are insulated from evidence and reason.313  Other God-
empty conceptions of religion are concerned with the identification of 
general and apparently non-religious values that are worthy of legal 
protection.  Examples of such intrinsic and valuable aspects of religion 
include: the values behind human conscience,314 ethical integrity,315 
                                                          
312.  Laborde, supra note 226, at 590 (arguing that “there has been a tendency, 
among legal practitioners, to re-describe [particular religious] practices in the 
language of conscientious obligation, so as to accommodate them under the label of 
freedom of religion.”).  
313.  LEITER, supra note 56, at 33-34. Koppelman is critical of Brian Leiter’s 
conception of religion, referring to it as “a radically impoverished conception.”  
Koppelman, supra note 305, at 962; see also McConnell, supra note 226, at 784 
(suggesting, “it is futile to draw up a list of features descriptive of religion and only 
of religion.  What makes religion distinctive is its unique combination of features, as 
well as the place it holds in real human lives and human history.”)  See also François 
Boucher & Cécile Laborde, Why Tolerate Conscience?, 10 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 493, 496 
(2016) (stating that “Leiter fails to establish insulation from reasons and evidence as 
the demarcating feature of religion.  This is because he draws on incompatible 
interpretations of ‘insulation from reasons and evidence’ to reply to different 
challenges regarding either the under-inclusiveness or the over-inclusiveness of his 
definition of religion.”).  
314.  NUSSBAUM, supra note 223, at 168-69.  But see KOPPELMAN, supra note 
223, at 153 (arguing that “[it] is not clear how Nussbaum can maintain the distinction 
between her position and a libertarian view in which any regulation of anyone’s 
conduct is presumptively invalid . . . . [As such], [t]he boundaries of protection in 
Nussbaum are thus uncertain.”).  See also Laborde, supra note 226, at 589 (arguing 
that the substitution position is not able to provide equal protection to all religious 
practices that are valuable, though not always on conscientious grounds). 
315.  Laborde, supra note 226, at 589. 
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deep ethical commitments,316 hope and vulnerability to injustice.317  
These valuable—though not specifically or distinctly religious—
aspects of religion justify the special legal protection of religious beliefs 
and manifestations. 
The synthesis of our twofold response fits the tendency of re-
description, which suggests that in analyzing the legal aspects of a 
religious manifestation case, it is neither necessary nor useful to define 
or understand that case in distinct religious terms.  The tendency of re-
description arises from projects that aim to rethink religious freedom in 
a religion-empty way, protecting both theistic and non-theistic beliefs 
and manifestations.  The normative argument is that both theistic and 
non-theistic beliefs and manifestations with an intrinsic value, which 
attaches to valuable aspects of a human life, should be treated with the 
same amount of respect and concern.  As such, religious freedom has 
been rethought, approached and defended as: the liberty of 
conscience,318 the right to moral freedom,319 the right to ethical 
independence, and the citizens’ equal right to live outside the state.320 
Thus far, we have argued that the synthesis of our twofold response 
decouples religion from any God and relies mainly on non-religious 
language to re-describe religious matters.321  The question is whether 
we could provide a more coherent description of our synthesis, 
encompassing both the decoupling and re-description aspect of the 
debate in jurisprudence about law and religion.  In other words, is it 
possible to systematically identify and subsequently define the feature 
that serves as the binding characteristic of the liberal theories of 
religious freedom?  This feature looks beyond the varieties of normative 
                                                          
316.  DWORKIN, supra note 30, at 5. 
317.  KOPPELMAN, supra note 223, at 122 (discussing hope); Eisgruber & Sager, 
supra note 20, at 1248 (discussing the vulnerability to injustice). 
318.  MACLURE & TAYLOR, supra note 255, at 89; NUSSBAUM, supra note 223, 
at 169. 
319.  Perry, supra note 64, at 996. 
320.  DWORKIN, supra note 30, at 130 (on the right to ethical independence); 
SULLIVAN, supra note 223, at 159 (on the right to live outside the state). 
321.  Cf. Peter Jones, Religious Exemptions and Distributive Justice, in 
RELIGION IN LIBERAL POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 163 (Cécile Laborde & Aurélia Bardon 
eds., 2017) (explaining that the non-religious description of religious exemptions, 
such as the use of a cultural frame, fits the egalitarian strategy to defend religious 
exemptions on non-sectarian grounds).  
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positions and connects these perspectives through a common focus—
the justification grounds for the special legal protection of religion. 
With this presumption in mind, the starting point in identifying the 
potential binding element of the liberal theories of religious freedom is 
the interpretative concern about the proper legal definition of religion 
and religious freedom and the definition’s fair application in practice.  
This interpretative concern guides us to define the binding 
characteristic of the liberal theories of religious freedom.  First, we have 
seen that these theories aim to provide the most appropriate definition 
of religion in law.  Second, they have one important concern: the 
egalitarian attention to fair treatment of deep human commitments and 
beliefs. 
Hence, the binding characteristic is a normative response to the 
question: how should liberal democracies understand and accordingly 
deal with the concept of religion in law?  This binding element 
encompasses the entire body of arguments that paves the way for 
balancing religion’s role in law as it relates to the paradigm of liberal 
political philosophy.  The binding characteristic takes the form of an 
interpretative shield.  It is embedded in philosophical arguments that 
can resist the justification of religious freedom with an appeal to 
distinctly religious values.  In addition, it draws on a non-sectarian 
language to conceptualize religion and religious manifestations. 
What does this interpretative shield suggest about the binding 
feature of the liberal theories of religious freedom?  Does it help provide 
a more coherent definition of our synthesis that covers the decoupling 
and the re-description aspects of the law and religion debate in 
jurisprudence?  Yes, it does. The negative answer to the question as to 
whether religion qua religion requires special legal protection stands 
for abstraction from the religious dimension.  The abstraction theory 
entails that religion does not deserve special protection in law qua 
religion.  Religion receives only a special treatment through abstraction, 
meaning through the non-sectarian, protection-worthy categories that 
serve as proper liberal substitutes for the category of religion.  This is 
due to the egalitarian approach of religious freedom’s liberal theories 
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to theistic and non-theistic beliefs and the emphasis of these theories on 
neutrality toward any particular worldview.322 
Abstraction manifests itself by refusing to justify religious freedom 
through appeals to religious values, thus rejecting the toleration of 
religion qua religion.  Moreover, it also refuses to justify free exercise 
by appealing to a more general framework of values that are not theistic 
per se.  Even more, abstraction insists that justifications for religious 
exceptions, like for any other type of legal exception, need to be 
ecumenical.323 
As with ritual dietary restrictions, the liberal argument suggests 
exemptions are granted not because of any religious narrative, but 
because of the commitment to respect the human conscience equally.324  
The abstraction theory unveils that within the liberal paradigm of 
political philosophy, religious freedom is in fact a euphemism for 
abstraction from the religious dimension.  As such, abstraction is not 
about the empirical argument concerning the specialness of religion.  
Rather, abstraction covers the complete body of conceptual and 
normative arguments that either strongly (rejection) or less strongly 
(substitution, generalization, equation and representation) oppose to the 
empirical reality in liberal democracies that treats religion as special 
qua religion. 
However, the abstraction theory provides two ways to understand 
the law and religious scholarship within the paradigm of liberal political 
philosophy.  First, the metaphysics of religion are not considered 
special—this has a legal explanation.  The abstraction argument 
suggests that law always abstracts from a particular perspective toward 
a more general perspective.  Second, religion is not a special protection-
worthy category in law qua religion.  Liberal theories of religious 
freedom strongly oppose favoritism of religious beliefs and practices, 
and abstraction is an ideological tool to equalize beliefs and 
experiences. 
                                                          
322.  Laborde, supra note 294, at 249 (for a discussion of the egalitarian theories 
of religious freedom).  There is also a legal explanation for the phenomenon of 
abstraction, however that is beyond the scope of this article.  
323.  Ecumenical, here, is not in the religious meaning of the word, but rather 
in the sense of being widely accessible to a broad public, and not because of the quality 
of people’s beliefs but simply because they are human beings who share certain 
important features, such as the conscience. 
324.  Cf. MACLURE & TAYLOR, supra note 255, at 77. 
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C. Abstraction and “Living Together” 
Abstraction and “Living Together” directs our attention back to 
S.A.S., the recommendations of the EU Parliament, the “reconciliation 
strategy” and the reinforcement of majoritarianism.  Is the 
“reconciliation strategy” a paradigmatic expression of recent 
developments in legal theory and liberal political philosophy about 
religion’s role in justifying accommodation and decisions in law and 
politics?  In other words, does the abstraction theory help us to reconcile 
diversity with majoritarian sensitivities under critical scrutiny?  It does.  
The abstraction theory, with its emphasis on the use of religiously 
neutral or religion-empty language in discussions concerning the 
lawfulness of contentious religious manifestations helps us discuss the 
outcome of S.A.S. in light of the most recent theoretical developments 
in the field of liberal political philosophy.  On the one hand, presenting 
an extant religious manifestation (such as face-covering veils) as a 
matter of gender-equality, human dignity, and “living together” fits the 
non-sectarian approach of abstraction.  Indeed, the abstraction theory 
does not support any legal discussion of religious practices from a 
sectarian perspective, meaning an exclusively religious view.  In other 
words, the use of that language fits the tendency of “re-describing” 
extant religious manifestation in non-religious terms.  That is not 
problematic per se.  But the Travel Ban case has shown that such a 
facially neutral language does not help to vanish its history of animus 
toward Muslims.325 
Furthermore, reinforcing the argument that particular lifestyles are 
not welcome might pose a serious danger to the egalitarian defense of 
religious freedoms.  The abstraction theory has unveiled the notion that 
liberal theories of religious freedom strongly oppose favoring or 
disfavoring a particular lifestyle because of the specific narratives 
behind that lifestyle.326  Nevertheless, the empirical argument suggests 
something else. 
                                                          
325.  Matthew J. Lindsay, The Perpetual Invasion: Past as Prologue in 
Constitutional Immigration Law, 23 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 369, 389 (2018) 
(on file with author) (rightly pointing out that Trump’s anti-Muslim rhetoric during 
the Presidential campaign, was more than a slip of the tongue). 
326.  Cf. DWORKIN, supra note 30 at 130; Perry, supra note 64 (both arguing 
that the state should not prescribe how people should live their lives). 
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Over the past few years, particularly over the last decade and in the 
aftermath of terrorist attacks that are linked to radicalized Islamic 
groups, a growing number of liberal democracies have developed 
monitoring policies that single out Muslims and Muslim organizations 
for special bans.327  The arguments used to defend these types of 
prohibitions are similar: defending the neutrality of the state, avoiding 
radicalization, and combatting life styles that are contrary to Western 
norms.  The latter objective challenges us to think about the 
compatibility of these special bans with the standards of liberal political 
philosophy that has shaped the contours of modern liberal democracies.  
Within this liberal paradigm of political thought, the state should refrain 
from favoring or disfavoring particular lifestyles.  As a result, the recent 
prohibitions targeting Muslims across liberal democracies for their 
norm deviant behavior violates the favored egalitarian understanding of 
religious freedom.  Hence, the endorsement of living together and the 
reinforcement of majoritarianism are both paradigmatic expressions of 
the shifts toward ethnocentrism that is little tolerant of non-mainstream 
ideas and practices. 
III. THE PRAGMATIC DEFENSE 
The reinforcement of majoritarianism results in the creation of the 
“good religion,” which is adopted by the vast majority.  Subsequently, 
“bad religions” are outlawed by making diversity and religious plurality 
majoritarian-proof.  The outcome is the establishment of a “State’s 
Religion,” which clearly admires the category of good religions of the 
dominant majority.  These are basically religious practices and beliefs 
that fit the state’s agenda of how citizens should live their lives.  Hence, 
practices and beliefs that do not fall within the category of good 
                                                          
327.  See generally Khaled A. Beydoun, 9/11 and 11/9: The Law, Lives and Lies 
That Bind, 20 CUNY L. REV. 455 (2017) (on the anti-Muslim agenda of President 
Trump); Mark C. Rahdert, Exceptionalism Unbound: Appraising American 
Resistance to Foreign Law, 65 CATH. U. L. REV. 537, 558 (2016) (critical of singling 
out Sharia law qua Sharia for a special ban); Yaser Ali, Shariah and Citizenship—
How Islamophobia is Creating a Second-Class Citizenry in America, 100 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1027 (2012) (on how anti-Muslim initiatives reinforce disparities); Jennifer 
Heider, Unveiling the Truth behind the French Burqa Ban: The Unwarranted 
Restriction of the Right to Freedom of Religion and the European Court of Human 
Rights, 22 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 93 (2012) (on file with author) (on the rise of 
Islamophobia and how this affects the fundamental rights of Muslims). 
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religions are banned, restricted, or labeled as “unwelcome.”  The 
question is: are we able to develop argumentation patterns that help us 
refrain from this dangerous path, while remaining aware of the security 
threats some beliefs pose to the core ideals of a liberal democracy?  Is 
it possible to rethink religious freedom in a way that is more “diversity-
friendly” and compatible with the egalitarian understating of this right 
that rejects religious toleration qua religious?  How can we develop 
argumentation patterns that would fit a broad sense of justice when we 
talk about religious freedom?  Reflecting on the implications potential 
bans would have on extant religious practices, internally and externally, 
is a helpful first exercise to develop the sort arguments needed to defend 
religious freedom beyond the sectarian justification of this right. 
A. The Anti-Alienation Argument 
To explain this argument we need to think about a real threat to a 
particular religious manifestation.  The potential ban on ritual infant 
male circumcision (“MC”) is an appropriate example.  Although, this 
practice has not been outlawed yet, a few “exceptional judgments” 
mirror the growing public outcry across Western countries to stop MC.  
These decisions consider the current legal approach to MC as contrary 
to the child’s best interests.  The argument is that given the high health 
risks of MC, such as the risk of developing sexual and mental health 
problems, the non-therapeutic ritual circumcision of boys should be 
postponed until the child is of an age that he can competently consent 
to the procedure.328  The most outspoken court ruling embracing this 
line of reasoning is the 2012 German Cologne Landgericht ruling.329  A 
similar decision was reached a few years earlier in Finland,330 and in 
                                                          
328.  Peter W. Adler, Is Circumcision Legal?, 16 RICH. J. L. & PUB. INT. 439, 
440-41 (2013).  
329.  The court ruled that parents’ right to religious freedom—in general—does 
not justify MC, if the intervention is not medically required.  The child should have 
the opportunity to decide himself about the status of his foreskin.  See also Bijan 
Fateh-Moghadam, Criminalizing Male Circumcision, 13 GERMAN L.J. 1131 (2012). 
330.  The Tampere District Court held that religious freedom does not justify 
the violation of bodily integrity.  The court referred to the ban on female circumcision 
and argued that toleration of male circumcision would result in discrimination.  See 
generally Heli Askola, Cut-Off Point? Regulating Male Circumcision in Finland, 25 
INT’L J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 100 (2011). 
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Iceland a bill to completely ban ritual male circumcision was 
designed.331 
Reflecting on the implications of a potential ban on ritual male 
circumcision would have internally, we can argue that such a total ban 
would give Jews and Muslims the impression that they do not enjoy 
equal respect from authorities.  This argument finds support in scholarly 
works that have found how anti-Sharia legal initiatives in the United 
States, such as the “Save our State” Amendment, have put Muslim 
communities at risk of isolation and alienation.332  Therefore, liberal 
democracies need to encourage mutual understanding between different 
groups of citizens.  This “anti-alienation” argument helps maintain the 
legal status quo of ritual male circumcision, not because of its sectarian 
nature, but rather because a total ban on this practice could further 
alienate marginalized groups that attach great importance to ritual male 
circumcision.333 
                                                          
331.  Harriet Sherwood, Iceland law to outlaw male circumcision sparks row 
over religious freedom, GUARDIAN (Feb. 18, 2018), 
https://www.theguardian.com/society/2018/feb/18/iceland-ban-male-circumcision-
first-european-country. 
332.  Ali, supra note 327, at 1031.  See also Ross Johnson, A Monolithic Threat: 
The anti-Sharia Movement and America’s Counter-Subversive Tradition, 19 WASH. 
& LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 183, 218 (2012). 
333.  OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN 
RIGHTS, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND 
BELIEF ON HIS MISSION TO DENMARK (2016).  Interestingly enough, the enormous and 
global sensitivity about a potential ban regarding male circumcision is completely 
absent in the area of female circumcision.  On the contrary, many countries around 
the globe have decided to eliminate this practice by either using standard laws banning 
assault and other types of physical harm or developing special bans on female 
circumcision.  See Renée Kool & Sohail Wahedi, European Models of Citizenship 
and the Fight against Female Genital Mutilation, in DEVELOPMENT AND THE 
POLITICS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 205-221 (Scott Nicholas Romaniuk & Marguerite 
Marlin Eds., 2015) (on file with author).  See also Saul Levmore, Can Wrinkles be 
Glamorous? in SAUL LEVMORE & MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, AGING THOUGHTFULLY: 
CONVERSATIONS ABOUT RETIREMENT, ROMANCE, WRINKLES, AND REGRET 104-05 
(2017) (saying “the fact that so many thoughtful people find female but not male 
circumcision abhorrent, suggests that a critical difference is that one is practiced on a 
group that is, at least to Western eyes, seriously constrained and subjugated by a 
variety of practices.”); see generally Hope Lewis & Isabelle R. Gunning, Essay: 
Cleaning Our Own House: Exotic and Familial Human Rights Violations, 4 BUFF. 
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 123 (1998).  On the presence of double standards in this context, 
see Obiajulu Nnamuchi, Hands off My Pudendum: A Critique of the Human Rights 
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B. The Wrong-Signal Argument 
Next to the anti-alienation argument, we can also reflect on the 
external effects of a ban on ritual male circumcision.  The question is: 
what implications would a ban on ritual male circumcision have for the 
foreign policies of liberal democracies?  Such policies are, among other 
matters, concerned with the protection of the rights of non-believers, 
atheists, proselytes, and critics of religion in countries that lack 
fundamental rights, such as the freedoms of speech, conscience, and 
association.334  Notably, religious freedom is within the human rights 
discourse understood as the right to believe, to not believe, to change 
religion, and to be able to criticize religion.  Therefore, a complete ban 
on ritual male circumcision, which has also been practiced in countries 
that do not have a strong human rights record, would further complicate 
and narrow our possibilities when asking to direct attention to the rights 
of vulnerable groups around the globe.  In other words, such a policy 
would send the wrong signal about religion and related freedoms.335 
This “wrong signal” argument accepts that within liberal 
democracies, religious freedom has no intrinsic liberal value.  It 
understands this freedom as a religion-empty liberty that provides 
protection to a wide range of beliefs and practices, without making a 
distinction between the theistic and non-theistic beliefs people may 
have.  However, in line with the political commitment to draw attention 
to the human rights situation of vulnerable groups,336 in countries that 
lack religious freedom, we would benefit from this freedom to raise 
awareness about the deplorable human rights situation of vulnerable 
groups.  We need to draw attention to the insecurity threatening these 
                                                          
Approach to Female Genital Ritual, 15 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L. J. 243, 253 (2011) 
(pointing out that a traditional practice like female circumcision is generally 
associated with harm and mutilation, while similar harsh language is absent from the 
discussion on cosmetic interventions upon female bodies). 
334.  The European Union has even a Special Envoy, Ján Figel, former Slovak 
diplomat, who promotes religious freedom as part of the European Union’s foreign 
policy.  See also Ján Figel, The European Union and Freedom of Religion or Belief: 
A New Momentum, 2017 BYU L. REV. 895 (2017). Cf. Jeremy Patrick, Religion and 
New Constitutions: Recent Trends of Harmony and Divergence, 44 MCGEORGE L. 
REV. 903 (2013). 
335.  Cf. Yusuf, supra note 69, at 293.  
336.  Vulnerable groups, in this context, include: atheists, adherents of new 
religions, and critics of religion. 
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vulnerable groups in countries that do not recognize the right to 
religious freedom.  Therefore, any serious restriction—such as a total 
ban on important religious practices like ritual male circumcision 
(relevant for many Muslims and Jews)—creates a complex situation for 
liberal democracies.337 
C. The Non-Sectarian Liberal Defense of Religious Liberty 
Although the pragmatic arguments help us to oppose a complete 
ban on MC and a toleration regime for FC, they are not the similar to 
principled arguments that criticize the ban on face-covering dresses and 
the proposed closure of mosques by the EU Parliament.  Opposing 
restrictions on the latter category of religious manifestations draws on 
matters related to liberties of conscience, expression, and association.  
The theory of abstraction from the religious dimension, with its 
emphasis on the egalitarian and non-sectarian understanding of 
religious freedom, provides principled arguments to oppose measures 
that unfairly restrict ways of life that are not favored by the majority.  
Meaning, that the pragmatic defense of religious freedom based on the 
“anti-alienation” and “wrong signal” arguments is not principled in 
nature.  This defense does not convincingly debunk the liberal rejection 
(the “strong rejectionist response”) and substitution (the “soft 
rejectionist response”) criticism.  However, for the time being, it 
provides arguments that explain why we should be aware of imposing 
restrictions upon certain extant religious manifestations.  The case of 
ritual circumcision reveals that any total ban on ritual male 
circumcision would call for both internal and external resistance.  
Hence, the pragmatic arguments warn us for the implications of a ban 
internally and externally.  This reflection is a helpful exercise for 
developing a theory of religious freedom that endorses diversity for 
pragmatic reasons. 
                                                          
337.  We may also find support for this argument in Justice Kennedy’s 
concurring opinion in Trump v. Hawaii 138 S. Ct. at 2424, “The First Amendment 
prohibits the establishment of religion and promises the free exercise of religion.  
From these safeguards, and from the guarantee of freedom of speech, it follows there 
is freedom of belief and expression.  It is an urgent necessity that officials adhere to 
these constitutional guarantees and mandates in all their actions, even in the sphere of 
foreign affairs.  An anxious world must know that our Government remains committed 
always to the liberties the Constitution seeks to preserve and protect, so that freedom 
extends outward, and lasts.” (emphasis added). 
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However, there is something very crucial about the relationship 
between abstraction and the non-sectarian liberal defense of religious 
liberty.  What we should clearly dispatch, is the idea that the theory of 
abstraction—with its talent to undo religious practices from a religious 
angle, is effectively an open invitation to disregard fundamental rights 
of people.  Denying them the right to manifest or even have their own 
beliefs, and declaring them and religious accommodation at war. 
Liberal political philosophy has a dichotomous relationship with 
religion.  On the one hand it contends that religion qua religion should 
not be singled out for a special, or favored, treatment in law.  Hence, no 
religious freedom simply because religion is special.  On the other hand, 
liberal political philosophy includes many arguments we could rely on 
to say that religion qua religion should not be singled out for a special 
disfavored treatment in law.338  This is because of the reasons liberal 
political philosophy generally gives to object a legal protection regime 
for religion qua religion. 
This rejection is laid down in an egalitarian approach to questions 
of accommodation.  However, egalitarianism in this context does not 
imply that religious people should be deprived from the right to 
manifest their beliefs.  Egalitarianism, in relation to religious 
accommodation, challenges the legal protection regime, asking if there 
is anything special about religion that warrants a special and favored 
treatment of religion qua religion.  Admittedly, it answers this question 
negatively.  But it provides via abstraction a wide range of grounds and 
substitutes on which the toleration regime for religious accommodation 
can continue.  It continues, not because it involves religion, but, for 
example, because of conscience and the high importance it attaches to 
the protection hereof.339 
                                                          
338.  Cf. the “inclusive non-accommodation” theory of religious freedom, as 
discussed by Micah Schwartzman.  The inclusiveness of this theory is related to the 
public justification debate (on the “specialness” of religion for the purpose of 
justifying public decisions), implying that religion is not something special for the 
justification of legal and political decisions.  Thus, no limitation on adding religion to 
the body of categories that can be used by legal and political authorities to justify their 
decisions.  Similarly, religion is not special for the accommodation question: religions 
and non-religions should be treated equally by granting exemptions.  See 
Schwartzman, supra note 38, at 22. 
339.  Wahedi, supra note 54. 
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This egalitarian challenge to religious accommodation does not 
only help us critically revisit the protection regime for a wide range of 
religious practices.  It also helps us to dismantle and uncover double 
standards behind plans that target religion, either in an implicit way or 
a clear showing of animus toward religion.  Hence, the egalitarian 
perspective—with its focus on the non-sectarian substitutes of 
religion—helps us to challenge facially neutral grounds that effectively 
challenge the lawfulness of religious manifestations or target the 
adherents of a particular religion.340 
Since singling out religion qua religion for special legal protection 
is problematic, it is equally troublesome to single out religion qua 
religion for special prohibitions.  To put it differently, neither sectarian 
grounds nor grounds evincing animosity toward religion should be 
considered decisive for granting exemptions or issuing bans.  Both are 
equally objectionable.  This point can be illustrated in light of the 
problematic cases we have discussed in this article and by asking 
ourselves the following two questions.  First, does the action attest to 
singling out religion qua religion for a disfavored treatment?  Second, 
would we have been able to scrutinize this action in absence of religious 
freedom? 
Let’s begin with The Austrian “Islam bill.”  Does the ban for 
Islamic organizations and houses of worship on receiving foreign 
founding attest to singling out religion qua religion for a disfavored 
treatment?  It does.  Other religious groups do not face similar 
restrictions.  Hence, this may point to the presence of double standards 
in dealing with religious radicalization, the facially neutral ground the 
restriction rests on.  But, would we have been able to scrutinize this 
action in absence of religious freedom?  Yes.  The limitations it poses 
on the freedom of association and the opportunities to have equal access 
to, for example, crowdfunding actions, would help us argue that the 
Austrian bill is wrong, apart from the fact that it implies a double 
standard.  Both the substitution and the equation approach would help 
us at this point to challenge the legality of the Austrian “Islam bill.” 
Next, let’s review the French ban on face-covering dresses.  Does 
the French Prohibition Law attest to singling out religion qua religion 
for a disfavored treatment?  It does.  The notorious history of this ban 
                                                          
340.  See generally Sohail Wahedi, Muslims and the Myths in the Immigration 
Politics of the United States, CAL. W. L. REV. (forthcoming).  
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contains many indications revealing this ban was initiated as a response 
to Islamic manifestations in public.341  The exceptions it contains, for 
example, for those who cover their faces to participate in traditional and 
artistic events, reinforce the suspicion that the ban effectively singled 
out an Islamic practice qua Islamic.  Would we in any way have been 
able to scrutinize this action in absence of religious freedom?  Yes.  We 
would have approached this ban, for example, as contradictory to 
freedom of conscience, as the women who cover their faces are 
deprived from the right to live in accordance with their deepest 
convictions, without posing serious harm to other people or the society 
as a whole.  Hence, the substitution approach to religion and the 
generalization approach to religious freedom, rethink this right as the 
right to ethical independence and helps us to put the ban under critical 
scrutiny. 
Our next illustration is the Travel Ban of President Trump.  Does 
the enactment of travel restrictions for people coming from Muslim 
majority countries attest to singling out religion qua religion for a 
disfavored treatment?  It does.  The issuance of the Travel Ban 
incarnated the promise of Republican Party’s Candidate Trump to close 
all the U.S. borders to Muslims.342  But, would we have been able to 
scrutinize this action in absence of religious freedom?  Yes.  The Travel 
Ban—lacking a profound justification for the choice of targeted 
nations—is an obvious example of discrimination based on nationality.  
Furthermore, the fact that the Ban mainly targets Muslims—or people 
coming from Muslim majority countries—makes it possible to posit 
that it is clearly against the freedom of expression, as it hinders people 
to pursue their path of beliefs.  The equation and the substitution 
approaches would help us to further challenge the Travel Ban in 
absence of religious freedom. 
We can add the Save our State debacle in the state of Oklahoma, 
singling out the Sharia law for a special ban to the list of examples 
discussed.  And we can even revisit the legality of ritual male 
                                                          
341.  Adrien Katherine Wing & Monica Nigh Smith, Critical Race Feminism 
Lifts the Veil: Muslim Women, France, and the Headscarf Ban, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
743, 746 (2006) (saying that the bans in this area were meant to target the Islamic 
appearance in public qua Islamic for a disfavored treatment). 
342.  Cf. Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, National Security, Immigration and the 
Muslim Bans, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1475, 1501 (2018) (arguing that the issued 
travel bans effectively incarnate Donald Trump’s promise of issuing a Muslim ban).  
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circumcision—although this illustration would ask a much deeper 
discussion.  On the one hand, we may rely on the non-sectarian 
argument that parents should have the autonomy to raise their child in 
accordance with their convictions.  But does this mean that we should 
similarly create exemptions for those types of female circumcision that 
are comparable to male circumcision?  And does autonomy allow to 
irreversibly alter the body of your own child, even if there is no medical 
support for that alteration?  That is very questionable—but our brief 
analysis is large enough to conclude that facially neutral arguments do 
not cleanse legislative steps from obvious animus towards religion. 
Furthermore, our brief analysis has shown us what we could have 
done in all these cases in absence of religious freedom.  In other words, 
do we lose anything if we would delete religious freedom from the 
constitution?  Apart from the pragmatic arguments we have provided at 
the beginning of this section, we contend that we do not lose anything.  
The paradigm of liberal political philosophy contains enough 
arguments to oppose any mistreatment of religious people qua 
religious.  Hence, the abstraction knife cuts on two sides: it is a helpful 
strategy to repackage and undo religious practices from their religious 
dimension, but it is never as such a justificatory strategy for obvious 
discrimination, religious intolerance, and spread of hatred toward 
unpopular religious groups or religions. 
CONCLUSION 
This article has reflected on the reconciliation of diversity with 
majoritarian sensitivities as present in the Travel Ban of President 
Trump, the Save our State initiative from Oklahoma, and the religious 
freedom jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights.  The 
European Court of Human Rights has “notoriously been lenient toward 
practices of Christian establishment and overtly intolerant toward the 
presence of Islam in the public sphere.”343  Reconciliation of diversity 
questions with majoritarian sensitives effectively reinforces 
majoritarianism and advances a political agenda that is not tolerant of 
the practices of religious minorities.  This development violates the 
advocated egalitarian understanding of religious freedom.  To face the 
challenge at this point, this article has developed two novel pragmatic 
                                                          
343.  LABORDE, supra note 39, at 33. 
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arguments in favor of religious freedom.  These arguments are not 
principled in nature.  However, for the time being, they provide very 
strong arguments to reflect critically upon the internal and external 
implications of a potential ban on extant religious manifestations of 
religious minorities.  This is a temporary defense of religious freedom 
rooted in grounds that are non-sectarian, non-majoritarian, and non-
violent to the advocated egalitarian conception of religious freedom.  In 
addition to the development of this pragmatic framework this article has 
set out why even in absence of the right to religious freedom, religious 
people and their practices warrant protection, that is because these cases 
involve matters of conscience, association, and expression.344 
The dichotomous relationship of liberal political philosophy with 
religion does not support a disfavored treatment of either singling 
people or their religion out for special prohibitions and restrictions.  
Ultimately, this helps us “hold the coordinate branches to account when 
they defy our most sacred legal commitments.”345 
 
                                                          
344.  Cf. LEITER, supra note 56, at 64. 
345.  Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2448 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
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